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1 Introduction
In this paper, we describe the evolution of earnings and employment, post-displacement
and post-other-separation, for workers in France and Germany. Although the literature
on displaced workers (i.e. involuntary worker separations from stable jobs for reasons
beyond their control) in North America is already extensive, the European literature is
limited. We consider two labor markets, France and Germany, in which layo®s are heavily
regulated (as opposed to the relatively °exible Canadian and United States labor mar-
kets). We exploit administrative data that matches workers to their employers from both
countries, which has the advantages (relative to survey-based analyses) of providing large,
representative samples of a wide range of workers from all sectors, and allowing for the
straightforward construction of control groups. Administrative data have the additional
advantage that reported earnings and employment durations are precisely measured and
not subject to recall bias.
One particularity of our approach is that we focus our attention on workers whose
separation is a result of the closure of the employing ¯rm (in the case of France) or
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1plant (in the case of Germany). This is for two main reasons. First, our administrative
data does not allow us to distinguish the reason for separation when the separation is
not related to the employer's shutting down. Second, our measure avoids the frequently-
cited problem of relying on workers to accurately report the reason for separation. This
is particularly important in heavily regulated labor markets like those of France and
Germany, since the administrative procedures that must be followed in the case of layo®s
are typically much longer and more complicated than the procedures surrounding quits.
For this reason, declared quits in these countries may frequently be layo®s disguised so
as to avoid the administrative complications. Furthermore, workers often misreport ¯ring
for cause as layo®s - and these two events have possibly very di®erent implications for the
nonemployment durations and earnings losses involved.
A second issue is that we consider nonemployment, as opposed to unemployment,
durations following displacement. This is due in part to the fact that, in France, our
data do not allow us to distinguish whether the worker is actively looking for employment
when not employed (as the ILO de¯nition of unemployment requires). In Germany we
only observe unemployment bene¯t and unemployment assistance durations, although
individuals may experience spells of unemployment while being ineligible for bene¯ts.
Another reason is that the complexity of the unemployment insurance schemes (see section
2 below) brings the explicit modeling of their role beyond the scope of this paper.1
In addition to describing the institutional context in France and Germany, our analysis
focuses on nonemployment durations and earnings changes experienced by workers who
have stayed with a single ¯rm for at least 4 years as the principal measures of interest.
More precisely, we look at prime age males in the age range of 26-55 (for France) and
25-56 (for Germany). We distinguish in our analysis between workers who separate from
their ¯rm (in the case of France) or plant (in the case of Germany) as a result of a closure
(referred to as displaced workers), and those who separate for unknown reasons. This
last category includes workers who are ¯red for cause, workers who left the ¯rm (plant)
because they received a better o®er, and workers who dropped out of the labor force.2 The
literature has concentrated primarily on these measures,3 ¯nding that displaced workers
tend to experience earnings losses both pre- and post-displacement, and that workers
displaced as a result of a ¯rm/plant closure tend to have shorter nonemployment durations
1See, for example, Bonnal and Fougµ ere (1993, 1996) for France and Hunt (1995) for Germany.
2Note that our age selection criteria are designed to eliminate retirement as a destination after sepa-
ration from one's employer.
3See Fallick (1996) for a survey.
2than workers who involuntarily separate from their employers for other reasons(Gibbons
and Katz 1991).
The structure of our paper is as follows. We begin by describing the institutional
setting surrounding layo®s and unemployment bene¯ts in France and Germany in section
2. This discussion provides the context in which the subsequent results need to be consid-
ered. After describing the data sources that we use in section 3, we describe the incidence
of displacement in the two countries in section 4. We then proceed with a more detailed
analysis of the nonemployment durations following displacement in section 5, followed by
a description of the earnings changes associated with displacement in section 6. Section
7 provides results of a regression analysis of earning changes before, around and after
displacement, and section 8 summarizes our results and concludes.
2 Institutions
Both France and Germany have detailed regulations concerning layo®s and unemployment
compensation. For each country, we describe the institutions surrounding layo®s followed
by a brief description of the unemployment bene¯t system and the main prevailing wage
setting mechanisms.
France
The following is a brief summary of the labor law and jurisprudence surrounding worker
displacement, or more precisely, layo®s for economic reasons. An excellent reference for
this (in French) is Lefebvre (1996).
Laws Concerning Layo®s for Economic Reasons
The legislation and jurisprudence surrounding layo®s for economic reasons 4 distinguishes
4 classes of layo®s: individual, less than 10 employees over 30 days, more than 10 em-
ployees over 30 days, and bankruptcy or reorganization.5 One common characteristic of
all layo®s for economic reasons is that the employer is required to propose the option of
4French labor law distinguishes between layo®s for economic reasons and layo®s for personal reasons,
such as inadequate performance or misconduct.
5There are special considerations for large companies that lay o® at least 10 people over a 3 month
period without passing the 10 people in 30 day limit, but these will not be treated here.
3participating in a (partially employer-funded) retraining scheme, run by the fund that
¯nances unemployment bene¯ts (ASSEDIC), to all employees who will be laid o®.
² Individual layo®s for economic reasons have to meet the obligations surrounding
both individual layo®s for personal reasons and layo®s of less than 10 employees over
30 days (with the exception of the obligation to inform the works council, see below).
The individual layo®s for personal reasons obligations include a convocation to a
\reconciliation" meeting at which the layo® will be discussed, the actual holding of
the reconciliation meeting (to which the worker can bring an outside representative)
and the noti¯cation of layo® letter, all with required delays and notice periods. In
addition, the employee subject to an individual layo® for economic reasons must be
guaranteed priority in future hiring for all jobs for which he or she is quali¯ed, and
this obligation runs for 1 year following the layo®.
² The case of layo®s for economic reasons involving less than 10 employees in a 30
day period is more complicated than that of individual layo®s for economic reasons.
First, the works council (or personnel representatives in ¯rms too small (less than 50
employees) to have a works council) must be consulted. The employer must provide
all useful information to the works council concerning the economic circumstances
that motivate the layo®s, the number of employees to be laid o® by occupational
category, the criteria used to determine the order of layo®s (i.e. which employees
will go) and a preliminary calendar for the layo®s. Each employee still has to be
invited to a \reconciliation" meeting, and the layo® letters can only be sent out
after the appropriate waiting period following this meeting.
² In the case of collective layo®s involving more than 10 people over a 30 day period,
things become even more complicated. The enterprise must devise a \social plan"
which, in addition to proposing ASSEDIC retraining programs, must also describe
the possibilities for an internal reclassi¯cation within the enterprise (when the enter-
prise is larger than 50 employees), and the steps the enterprise is prepared to take in
terms of helping laid o® employees become self-employed, providing training in new
¯elds, or reducing the work week. Along with all of the information described above
in the case of fewer than 10 layo®s, this plan has to be given to the works council
(when one exists, otherwise it goes to the personnel delegates) for consultation, and
the works council can request the help of an \expert accountant" to evaluate the
di®erent aspects of the employer's social plan and explanations for the layo®s. The
local labor ministry o±ce also receives a copy of the social plan, and both the works
4council and the labor ministry can make suggestions to which the employer must
respond. There must be 2 meetings held with the works council, or 3 if the works
council brings in an accountant. There are speci¯ed delays between each meeting
which vary with the size of the proposed layo®, but there is no obligation to meet
individually with each employee in this case. The selection of the individuals to
be laid o® will typically be determined by a governing collective agreement, but
in the absence of such an agreement it is the employer who ¯xes the criteria after
consultation with the works council. The layo® letters can only be sent out after a
¯xed delay following the ¯nal meeting with the works council.
² The conditions surrounding layo®s in the case of bankruptcy or court-ordered re-
organization are similar to those for layo®s of 10 or more employees, except that
it is the court-appointed administrator who makes the proposals, and the judge
responsible for overseeing the liquidation or reorganization must approve all layo®s.
Advance Notice and Severance Pay
The forewarning that workers receive before being laid o® varies according to the size of
the layo®, whether or not an expert accountant is called in, the size of the ¯rm and whether
the employer decides to buy o® the notice period. The time taken by just following the
legal procedure (prior to the o±cial advance notice that starts running from the moment
the layo® letter is received) can vary from 35 days from the mailing of the convocation
to the \reconciliation" meeting to the sending out of the layo® letter (in the case of an
individual layo® for economic reasons), to 74 days or more starting from the date at which
the ¯rst works council meeting is held (in the case of a layo® of 10 or more people in 30
days, with expert accountant called in, not counting the time it takes to devise the social
plan or respond to suggestions made by the works council and the labor ministry). After
the layo® letters are sent out, the o±cial advance notice period begins. This period is
a function of seniority: 1 month for employees with 6 months to 2 years of seniority,
2 months for employees with at least 2 years of seniority. If there exists a collective
agreement that provides for longer notice periods, then the longer periods prevail.
Severance pay is a function of seniority, whether or not the employee had accrued
unused paid vacation time, and whether the employer buys o® the o±cial notice period. In
general, the base rate of severance pay is 1/10th of monthly earnings per year of seniority
(if seniority is greater than 2 years), with an additional 1/15th of monthly earnings per
year of seniority if seniority is greater than 10 years. The worker also recovers the value
5of unused paid vacation time, plus 1-2 months of earnings in the case where the notice
time is bought o®, corresponding to the level of seniority.
Unemployment Bene¯t Eligibility and Levels
To be eligible for unemployment bene¯ts, workers must meet the following conditions.6
First, they have to have been employed for a su±ciently long period preceding the start of
the episode of unemployment. There are 5 criteria involving a minimum number of days
or hours worked over a reference period.7 Second, they must be enrolled on the National
Job Search Agency (ANPE ) lists. Third, they can not have voluntarily quit their previous
job. All layo®s, even for cause, are acceptable.8 Fourth, they must be actively looking
for a job, or if over 57 1/2 years old, reside in France. Fifth, they can not be older than
60, or between 60 and 65 and eligible for retirement with full bene¯ts. Sixth, they must
be physically able to hold down a job. Finally, they can not be \seasonally unemployed";
that is, they can not have come from a job that is classi¯ed as seasonal, nor can they have
had a job that, for 2 of the past 3 years, has regular periods of inactivity at more or less
the same calendar dates each year.
Unemployment bene¯ts are taxable as revenue and are made up of a base rate that
applies for a ¯rst period, then a \digressivity coe±cient" which lowers the bene¯ts for a
6The links between the unemployment bene¯ts schedules and eligibility requirements are quite compli-
cated. What is presented here is a short synopsis of the important points of the unemployment insurance
law prior to the substantial reforms that took place in 1996.
7The criteria are as follows. a) 122 days or 676 hours of work over the last 8 months preceding the
end of the labor contract. b) 182 days or 1014 hours of work over the last 12 months preceding the end
of the labor contract. c) 243 days or 1352 hours of work over the last 12 months preceding the end of
the labor contract. d) 426 days or 2366 hours of work over the last 24 months preceding the end of the
labor contract. e) 821 days or 4563 hours of work over the last 36 months preceding the end of the labor
contract.
The end of the labor contract is de¯ned as the last day of the notice period, regardless of whether
this was bought o® or not. Workers who become unemployed due to the closure of their plant are not
required to satisfy criterion a). The levels and duration bene¯ts varies according to the criterion sati¯ed,
with the most di±cult criterion (e) providing the highest bene¯ts.
8Note that the eligibility rules for unemployment insurance give the worker the incentive to declare all
separations as involuntary, while the administrative procedures described above give the ¯rm the incentive
to declare separations as voluntary. This con°ict of interest often introduces a bargaining situation in the
case where the employer intends to lay o® a small number of workers. The ¯rm can make side payments
to the worker such that the worker declares the separation as voluntary (if asked) and does not apply for
unemlployment bene¯ts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a relatively frequent phenomenon.
6second period. The daily base rate is comprised of a ¯xed component (56.95 francs in
June 1996) and a variable component corresponding to 40.4% of the reference earnings.
The total can neither exceed 75% of the reference level of earnings nor be less than a
statutory minimum level (138.84 francs in June 1996). There are also provisions relating
to high-earnings workers that guarantee them at least 57.4% of their reference earnings.
The digressivity coe±cient and the durations of the bene¯t periods are functions both
of the age of the worker and his or her \length of a±liation" (cumulative seniority in any
covered employers during a reference period). Durations range from 122 days (4 months)
for workers with only 122 days or 676 hours of eligibility over the previous 8 months (all
at the second period rate with a digressivity coe±cient of 0.75) to an 821 day (27 month)
¯rst period and a 1004 day (33 month) second period, with digressivity coe±cient of 0.92,
for workers over 55 years old with 821 days, or 4563 hours of eligibility over the preceding
36 months. Thus if a 56 year old person worked 27 out of the 36 months preceding a spell
of unemployment, he or she would have a right to 5 years of bene¯ts, with the lowest rate
still being 92 percent of his or her previous bene¯t level.9
Wage Setting Institutions
During the period of time covered by our French data (1984-1989), the French industrial
relations environment was undergoing signi¯cant changes. Although union membership
was steadily declining, union coverage remained relatively stable. This phenomenon was
largely due to the policy of contract extension. This policy allows the Ministry of Labor
to take a collective agreement negotiated by an employers association and several union
confederations and extend its coverage to all other enterprises in the same region or sector,
or all individuals in the same occupation, as those covered by the contract, regardless of
their participation or membership in the employers association or union confederation
that actually negotiated the contract.10
Despite the high level of contract coverage, important modi¯cations in the structure
of collective bargaining were brought about by the Auroux laws of 1982. Two of the most
9Note that, upon expiration of unemployment bene¯ts, individuals may be eligible for the Minimum
Insertion Allowance (Revenu minimum d'insertion), or RMI. The RMI is a means-tested income support
whose conditions and levels are not directly linked to unemployment duration, previous wages or labor
market histories.
10See Margolis (1993) for a detailed discussion of the institutional context surrounding contract exten-
sion in France, as well as an analysis of the implications of contract extension for wage setting and ¯rm
participation in employers associations.
7important features were the establishment of works councils and the de¯nition of their
consultative role in mass layo®s (see above) and the requirement to engage in bargaining at
the enterprise level for all ¯rms over a minimum size. Although there was no obligation
to come to an agreement, the fact that employers were required to negotiate locally
encouraged a gradual shift of collective bargaining over wages from a centralized to a
more decentralized level. This shift reduced the frequency with which the national, often
extended, agreements had their salary grids renegotiated. Given the constant increase
in the real minimum wage over the period (see below), the share of contracts for which
the lowest earners on the salary grid earned more than the minimum wage fell from 15.3
percent in January of 1983 to 3.6 percent in January of 198511.
The ¯rst minimum wage law in France was enacted in 1950, creating a guaranteed
hourly wage rate that was partially indexed to the rate of increase in consumer prices.
Beginning in 1970, the original minimum wage law was replaced by the current system
(called the SMIC, \salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance") linking the changes
in the minimum wage to both consumer price in°ation and growth in the hourly blue-collar
wage rate. In addition to annual formula-based increases in the SMIC, the government
legislated increases many times over the next two decades. The statutory minimum
wage in France regulates the hourly regular cash compensation received by an employee,
including the employee's part of any payroll taxes.
Although the original minimum wage program (called the SMIG, \salaire minimum
interprofessionnel garanti") was only partially indexed, in particular the in°ation rate had
to exceed ¯ve percent per year (two percent from 1957 to 1970) to trigger the indexation,
the real minimum wage did not decline measurably over the entire post-war period and
increased substantially during most decades.12 The French minimum wage lies near most
of the mass of the wage rate distribution for the employed work force. In 1990, the
¯rst mode of the wage distribution was within ¯ve francs of the minimum wage and the
second mode was within 10 francs of the minimum. In the overall distribution, 13.6%
of the wage earners were at or below the minimum wage and an additional 14.4% were
within an additional 5F per hour of the SMIC.13
11See Bughin (1985).
12The in°ation threshold was removed in 1970 with the reform that converted the SMIG into the SMIC.
13For a detailed analysis of the minimum wage in France, see Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1998).
82.1 Germany
Employment Security and Dismissal Protection
German dismissal protection is based on an extensive system of legal rules and collective
contracts. Historically, dismissal protection is rooted in a framework of directives devel-
oped during the Weimar Republic. It was developed in the 50's { 70's, and went through
a process of amendments during the 70's and 80's (see BÄ uchtemann (1990)).
One can distinguish between general dismissal protection and speci¯c dismissal pro-
tection, with the latter applying to individuals in speci¯c situations. The general dismissal
protection is regulated in the BÄ urgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) and in the KÄ undigungsschutzgesetz
(KSchG). Since then, it has undergone a number of slight revisions.14 The most notable is
the Employment Promotion Act (BeschÄ aftigungsfÄ orderungsgesetz), or EPA of 1985, which
is discussed below in more detail.
The KSchG applies to all blue and white collar workers with more than 6 months of
uninterrupted tenure in ¯rms with more than 6 regularly employed workers. According
to BÄ uchtemann (1990), it covers about 80 percent of all blue and white collar workers.
The general dismissal protection regulations as laid out in theKSchG are supplemented
by regulations which apply to individuals in speci¯c circumstances. For instance, speci¯c
regulations apply to handicapped people, people on maternity leave and people who are
serving in compulsory military or civil service. In 1987-88, 16 percent of all dismissals fell
under these complementary rules (see BÄ uchtemann (1990)).
According to the KSchG, all dismissals of employees who are employed for more than
6 months without interruption, and which are initiated by the employer, are invalid if
they are socially unacceptable. Accordingly, dismissals of all individuals to whom the
KSchG applies have to be justi¯ed by the employer. Acceptable reasons for dismissal
may be on the side of the ¯rm (rationalization, macroeconomic shocks), or on the side of
the employee (absenteeism, illness, etc.). In the case of dismissals which are caused by
economic di±culties on the side of the ¯rm, the KSchG stipulates that social criteria (e.g.
seniority) should be used to determine which employees are to be dismissed. Employees
who feel that they have been unjustly dismissed have the right to sue the employer in the
labor courts. In 1987, about 10 percent of dismissals were brought to court by dismissed
employees, although in very few cases did this lead to a continuation of the employment
14It has been complemented by the Arbeitsschutzbereinigungsgesetz (1969), the Betriebsverfassungsge-
setz (1972) and the Gesetz zur Ä Anderung des KSchG (1978).
9relation (see BÄ uchtemann (1990)). In addition, German dismissal protection has a strong
collective component. For every dismissal, the works council has to be consulted.
Concerns about the negative e®ects of the rather rigid dismissal protection regulations
on ¯rms' employment policies lead to the Employment Promotion Act (EPA) of 1985. The
EPA introduced some deregulating measures which do not replace, but rather complement,
existing employment protection regulations. They mainly promote ¯xed term contracts
as an instrument for enhancing °exibility. More speci¯cally, the EPA allows ¯xed term
contracts to be established without a particular reason (which was not the case before.)
Contracts are limited to a duration of 18 months, and they are not renewable. The EPA
was limited to 5 years, but has been extended twice, and at present its applicability lasts
until 2000 (see Rogowski and SchÄ omann (1996)).
2.1.1 Advance Notice and Severance Pay
The advance notice period in Germany varies according to the size of the layo®, the senior-
ity of the worker, and whether he or she is a blue or white collar worker.15 Furthermore,
there are a number of collectively bargained regulations as well as ¯rm-worker speci¯c
agreements that include notice provisions. The legal advance notice regulations stipulate
4 weeks of notice for blue collar workers who have been employed for at least 5 years,
and 12 weeks for white collar workers. After 20 years of employment with the same ¯rm,
these periods rise to 12 weeks and 24 weeks for blue and white collar workers respectively
(see Buttler, Brandes, Dorndorf, Gaum and Walwei (1992)).
If a ¯rm dismisses a considerable fraction of its work force, the layo®s have to be
reported to the local employment o±ce and to the works council. For instance, a ¯rm
which employs between 21 and 59 workers has to report if the number of dismissals exceeds
6 workers within a period of 30 working days; a ¯rm which employs between 60 and 499
employees has to report layo®s of more than 25 workers, or when layo®s exceed 10 percent
of the ¯rm's work force; a ¯rm which employes more than 499 workers has to report if
layo®s exceed 30 workers.
If the reduction in the ¯rm's work force exceeds certain numbers, the works council can
demand a social plan. For instance, when dismissals exceed 20 percent of the workforce
(or at least 6 workers for a ¯rm of size 21 - 59, for reporting to 25 workers (here) for
social plans? or more than 36 workers for a ¯rm of size 60 to 249), a social plan can
15The di®erential treatment of blue and white collar workers was abolished in October 1993. We report
here the regulations that were in force up to 1993, since our data covers the period up to 1990.
10be demanded. Social plans describe the conditions surrounding severance pay and other
payments.
Unemployment Bene¯t Eligibility and Levels
The German unemployment compensation scheme distinguishes between unemployment
insurance bene¯t (Arbeitslosengeld AG) and unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe
AH). To be eligible for AG, the employee must have contributed for at least 12 months over
the preceding 3 years to the system. The system is ¯nanced by employer and employee
contributions in equal parts (amounting to 3.25 percent of the employee's salary). There is
a waiting period of 12 weeks if the separation was induced by the employee, but receipt of
AG starts immediately if the separation was caused by the employer. The compensation
is based on previous net earnings, and it amounts to 67 percent of the previous net wage
(or 60 percent for employees without children). There is an upper threshold (for instance,
5200 DM in 1984, and 6000 DM in 1990). AG can be received for up to 32 months, with
the duration of the entitlement period depending on age and the length of contributions
to the scheme.16
If AG is exhausted, or if the employee is not eligible for AG, he can claim AH. A
condition for receiving AH in case of non-eligibility for AG is having been in insured
employment for at least 150 days during the last year. Like AG, AH is based on previous
earnings; it amounts to 57 percent of previous net earnings (50 percent for employees
without children). AH is means tested, and its duration is unlimited.
Both AG and AH are granted conditional on the recipient's agreement to accept a rea-
sonable employment (zumutbare BeschÄ aftigung) and are not subject to income taxation.
Wage-Setting Institutions
In Germany, wages are determined by (annual) negotiations between unions and employer
federations (tari® parties, or Tarifparteien). Workers are represented in collective bar-
gaining by unions that are organized nationwide according to industries (see Schmidt
(1994), for more details). Union membership is not tied to a particular job or ¯rm; union
workers usually remain with the union irrespective of their mobility decisions, as well as
through spells of non-employment.
16If an unemployed person ful¯lls the above criteria, the minimum period of eligibility is 156 days.
Depending on the duration of contribution payments and the age of the applicant, this period can be
extended to up to 832 days (see Kittner (1995), p. 192, for details.)
11Collective bargaining takes place on industry and regional level. During negotiations,
parties have a legally guaranteed autonomy. The results of the negotiations are laid down
in tari® contracts (or Tarifvertraege), which determine working conditions and wages.
These contracts are registered at the Ministry of Labor. Since the union is the legal
representative of all workers covered by collective bargaining (irrespective of workers'
union status), collective agreements apply to all workers within the respective segment.
There are no legal minimum wages in Germany; however, tari® contracts which specify
wage levels for speci¯c groups in speci¯c sectors can be considered as an elaborate system
of minimum wages.
To enforce their bargaining position, unions have the right to call strikes and employ-
ers have the right to lock out employees (Aussperrung), although this latter instrument
is regulated in a number of legal rules. If the two parties have di±culties reaching a
compromise, they may call for a mediator. The legal rules concerning the bargaining
procedures, as well as the commitment that binds the two parties to the agreed contract,
are laid down in the tari® contract law (Tarifvertragsgesetz).
3 Data
We use administrative data from payroll tax/Social Security records for both countries,
in some cases supplemented with data from other sources. We brie°y describe below the
data sources used in this paper.
France
The base data set for France is the Annual Social Data Reports (D¶ eclarations An-
nuelles des Donn¶ ees Sociales), or DADS , which is a random 1/25 sample of the French
population.17 All people born in October of an even-numbered year, with the exception of
civil servants (but including those employed by publicly held companies), are in the data
whenever they are employed.18 These data cover the period from 1976-1996, with the
exception of 1981, 1983 and 1990, since the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE)
17An exhaustive DADS data set ¯le does exist for use primarily by the tax authorities, but we were
only given access to the 1/25 sample.
18Note that these data include self-employed workers who pay themselves salaries. Self-employed
workers who act as pure residual claimants will not be included. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us
to separate self-employed wage earners from other wage earners.
12did not collect the 1/25 sample in these years. These data include earnings information
on all employers of all of these individuals,19 with both individual and employer identi¯ers
attached to each year-individual-enterprise-establishment observation. We also have the
number of days worked during the course of the year and the job start and end dates if
the job began or ended during the year. We impute information using auxiliary regres-
sions run on other data sets to determine the job start dates for the left-censored spells.20
Temporary layo®s (of a length of shorter than one calendar year) are not considered as
interruptions of an employment spell. With this information, we can calculate seniority
at each job for each year. We observe seniority, sex, age, occupation, region, full- or part-
time employment status (but not hours) and sector on all jobs held by the individual,
and measure the length of nonemployment spells between jobs.
There are two problems with using this data to study displaced workers. First, the
list of characteristics given above is exhaustive. Thus we do not know education, marital
status or number of children, for example. The Permanent Dynamic Sample (Echantillon
Dynamique Permanent), or EDP, provides some additional information. INSEE collected
data on individuals born on the ¯rst 4 days of October that could be located in the
1968, 1975, 1982 or 1990 censuses, or for whom one of the following was available: the
individual's birth, marriage or death certi¯cate, or the birth, death or marriage of a parent
or child of the individual concerned. Most of the demographic information of interest
comes from the matches with the censuses. Since the EDP sampling frame overlaps that
of the DADS in even-numbered years, it was possible to obtain a data set with all of the
relevant variables from the DADS and the EDP.21
The remaining problem is to know the reason behind a separation.22 We used a two-
19Our earnings data are available as 8-byte numeric variables and are subject to neither top nor bottom-
coding. All labor earnings are reported.
20See Abowd, Finer, Kramarz and Roux (1997) for details. Given that our analysis sample begins in
1984 and that we consider seniority as a categorical variable for which the largest category is 10 years
and above, our results are robust to most estimation error in the job start date due to the imputation
for the left censored spells.
21For individuals for whom EDP data was not available, we used a multinomial logit to impute the
probability that the individual had each of the educational degrees possible. See the data appendix of
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) for more details.
22From 1988-1992 (1990 excluded), INSEE introduced two variables distinguishing whether the obser-
vation corresponded to a plant that had ceased to exist as an \economic" or \administrative" entity. The
main di®erence between these variables is that ¯rms occasionally continue to exist \administratively", but
with zero workers, after their \economic" death. The manner by which mergers and acquisitions a®ect
the plant identi¯er in our data is rather involved. Unfortunately, these data have serious inconsistencies,
13step approach to identifying displacements, or more precisely, ¯rm deaths.23 First, we used
the Uni¯ed System of Enterprise Statistics (Systµ eme Uni¯¶ e de Statistiques d'Entreprise),
or SUSE, to determine the last year in which the employing ¯rm ¯led accounts with any
of France's administrative authorities.24 We then looked at all of the observations in the
DADS that correspond to a given enterprise (not establishment). If the last year in which
we observe data corresponding to the enterprise is 1996, we consider all separations from
that employer as being for reasons other than ¯rm death.25 If, on the other hand, we
observe a ¯rm for which the last year with DADS data is, say, 1985, we compare this
date to the date found in the SUSE (where available). We considered the latter of the
two dates for a given enterprise as its estimated death date, and we considered enterprises
who ¯led accounts or were paying employees in 1996 as ongoing.
For the \dying" enterprises, we attempted to control for false ¯rm deaths (change of
¯rm identi¯er without cessation of activity) with the following procedure. Given that we
only observe a random 1/25 sample of any ¯rm's employment, we focused explicitly all
¯rms with at least 3 observed employees.26 For these ¯rms, we tested the hypothesis that
as individuals whose observations correspond to the economic or administrative death of their plant in
the year t are just as likely to still be employed by the plant, and receiving a salary, in the year t + 1 as
they are to have separated from the plant. Thus we do not consider these variables informative for the
analysis of worker displacements.
23Our approach to de¯ning displacements is based on a combination of ¯rm accounts data and payroll
data. An alternative approach, such as considering separations that occur simultaneously with large
reductions in ¯rm employment as displacements (see Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993)) is not
feasible with our data, as ¯rm employment is not available for all employees at all dates.
24The SUSE data used here are a sample of enterprises in France with di®erential sampling probabilities
based on reporting requirements which vary with employment (the largest ¯rms appear with probability
1). Depending on the size of the ¯rm and the type of accounts it sends to the relevant regualting and
tax authorities, infomation may be available on a detailed balance sheet, income statement and °ow of
funds statement. The smaller enterprises are not required to provide as much detailed information. Here
we use the presence of any information on the ¯rm as a sign of its continued existence. Thus we do not
lose ¯rms when they pass below the threshold for providing detailed accounts.
25For separations in years prior to 1996, the ¯rm clearly continues to exist, as workers are observed
employed by it. For 1996, we are unable to determine whether the ¯rm will disappear in 1997. These
observations could theoretically be considered displacements, but given our eventual sample selection
restrictions (see below), the question of how to class these observations is moot.
26The requirement that there be at least 3 observed employees means that, in expectation, the corre-
sponding ¯rm has at least 75 employees. It prevents us from arbitrarily classifying all departures from
small ¯rms as false ¯rm deaths. On the other hand, it may cause us to miss all false ¯rm deaths among
the smallest ¯rms in our sample. Unfortunately, given that we only have access to the 1/25 sample of
employment, we cannot improve upon the treatment for small ¯rms beyond the SUSE sampling scheme.
1450 percent or more of the ¯rm's actual employees leaving the enterprise at its estimated
death date were employed by the same subsequent employer, conditional on the total
number of observed employees and the share of these who move together to the same
subsequent ¯rm identi¯er. This procedure is described in detail in appendix A.27
Based on this dating procedure and correction, we constructed two de¯nitions of dis-
placement. In the ¯rst, the worker separates from the ¯rm within the calendar year
preceding the calendar year of the ¯rm's death.28 In the second, we widen the window
to two years preceding the year of the ¯rm's death. We report below results based on
the two-year window de¯nition, since our procedure for dating ¯rm deaths is not very
precise (particularly when SUSE data is involved) and because advance notice provisions
may mean that some workers separate from their ¯rm prior to its actual shutdown.29 All
other separations are classed as \other separations".
It should be noted that, given the sampling scheme of the DADS, this approach over-
attributes separations to the \displaced" category. This is even more likely to be the case
for separations from small ¯rms, especially when the separation occurs near the end of the
sample period. Our selection criterion reduces the risk of this source of overclassi¯cation
somewhat (see below), but nevertheless all of our results for France should be interpreted
with this in mind.30
SUSE data are available from ¯nancial reports that are mandatory for ¯rms with total sales of at least
500,000 FF per year (or at least 150,000 FF per year for ¯rms in service industries) and are optional for
all others.
27We are grateful to Peter Kuhn for suggesting this algorithm.
28We consider the year preceding the year of ¯rm death since, with SUSE data at least, we do not
know the precise date within the year at which the ¯rm ceased operations. Furthermore, a ¯rm whose
¯scal year ends after June 30 of the year t +1 will have year t +1 SUSE information, even if operations
ceased in year t.
29Results based on the more strict de¯nition of displacement, considering only those separations occur-
ing within a year of ¯rm disappearance, are available upon request. A table indicative of the importance
of the de¯nitional di®erences can be found in appendix B.
30There exist other data sources that allow us to identify layo®s at the plant level and to classify them
by type (economic or personal reasons). However, these data do not allow us to tell which workers are
among those laid o® and are subject to an even more restrictive sampling scheme than the SUSE data.
One possible avenue for future research might assign a probability that a separation corresponds to a
layo® for economic reasons, as opposed to relying on a simple indicator variable to denote the reason for
each separation.
15The Sample Retained for Analysis
From the overall data base, we focus in particular on men between 26 and 50 years of
age and with 4 or more years of seniority in 1984.31 These restrictions were imposed so
that we could restrict our attention to adult,32 high-attachment workers that do not risk
taking early retirement in the later years in the sample.33 We excluded all individuals
with more than 3 di®erent employers in any given year, as well as all individuals who
held 2 or 3 jobs simultaneously at any point during our analysis window.34 As a further
control against early retirement, our duration analyses exclude all workers who, following
separation from their employer, experienced a censored nonemployment spell that pushed
them over 56 years old (the minimum age for men to receive early retirement). Appendix
C shows the di®erential e®ect of imposing this latter restriction by age at separation.35
We focus on individuals observed during the window of 1984-1989 for our analyses
for three reasons. First, given our de¯nition of ¯rm death for workers not matched to
SUSE ¯rms, we wanted to allow a time period after the end of the analysis period during
which we might potentially observe people in a \dead" ¯rm, in order to minimize incorrect
classi¯cations. Second, given the missing data in 1983 and 1990, this is the longest period
without interruption in our data. Finally, this sample window makes the French data
comparable with the German data (see below).
In general, we concentrate on the ¯rst separation observed for the individual in the
sample window (1984-1989), and in so doing ignore the issue of multiple displacements
(Stevens 1997).36 As mentioned above, our data include information on the year, age,
31Margolis (1999) and Margolis (forthcoming) treat both men and women.
32Because of the complex interplay between youth employment promotion schemes (for which eligibility
ends at 25 years of age) and the minimum wage in France (see Abowd, Kramarz, Lemieux and Margolis
(forthcoming)), we begin considering individuals after they reach 26 years old.
33Note that this does not mean that there will be no workers with seniority of less than 4 years in our
data. In particular, for the earnings change models, we use post-separation information during which
workers who have experienced a separation will typically have less than 4 years of seniority.
34This latter constraint eliminates 15.2 percent of the individuals from the DADS, and 16.7 percent of
the individual-year combinations that satisfy our eligility criterion (26-50 year old men with at least 4 years
of seniority in some job in 1984). In particular, 32.7 percent of the yearly observations corresponding to
workers whose ¯rst separation was a displacement, and 28.6 percent of the yearly observations of workers
whose ¯rst separation was for other reasons, were eliminated due to the restriction against simultaneous
job holding. This may bias our results. Similar models that allow for simultaneous job holding are
estimated in Margolis (1999) and Margolis (forthcoming).
35Note that the entire, non-selected, sample was used in the determination of ¯rm \death" dates.
36In order to give a more accurate picture of the incidence of worker displacement, we consider all
16education, seniority, log real annual gross earnings, sector of activity, skill level (unskilled
blue collar, skilled blue collar or white collar), region and, of course, the reason for sepa-
ration (displacement or other, calculated according to the procedures described above) if
it occurred. Appendix D provides descriptive statistics for the sample in 1984.
For the analyses of incidence and earnings changes surrounding separations, we ag-
gregated our data to one observation per individual per year.37 In years preceding the
separation, if the individual was employed by the employer from whom he or she will
eventually separate, we keep the descriptive information (sector, occupation, seniority)
corresponding to that job. For all other individual-year combinations, the descriptive
information corresponds to the job that the person held for the longest duration during
the year, and in the case of ties, the job that provided the highest gross earnings.
The earnings measure used for the French data was the log of Total Average Real
Daily Earnings38, corresponding to the log of the average of daily labor earnings from
all sources, weighted by the number of days worked in the particular job (measured in



















where RAEi;t;j is the real gross annual earnings received by individual i in year t from
¯rm j, dwi;j;t is the number of days worked by individual i in ¯rm j during year t and
J(i;t) is the set of ¯rms j in which individual i worked during year t.
Germany
The data used for Germany, which will be referred to as the IAB data, are comprised of
three components.
separations in our sample, since only considering ¯rst separations would severely underestimate the
incidence of worker displacement in the later years of our sample.
37The duration analyses are based on data with one observation per individual, corresponding to the
¯rst separation observed in our sample window.
38As our data do not allow us to measure revenues from non labor market sources, our earnings measure
is only available for years in which labor market earnings are strictly positive.
39It should be noted, however, that using such a measure can obscure the role of part year employment
on earnings (Farber 1999). Margolis (forthcoming) shows how conclusions concerning earnings movements
are sensitive to the earnings measure, in particular by comparing log annual earnings with log daily
earnings measures.
17The core data are drawn from the Beschaftigungsstichprobe (BS) of the Institut fur
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) in NÄ urnberg. The BS is a 1 percent sample
from the overall employees' statistics, the so called historic ¯le (Historikdatei), or HD, of
the Federal Department of Employment in NÄ urnberg, which is constructed as an insur-
ance account, and contains a continuous employment history for each employee covered
by the social security system. The BS is drawn in 2 stages (see Bender, Hilzendegen,
Rohwer and Rudolph (1996) for details) and covers a period of 16 years (1975-1990).
It comprises 426,363 individuals in the longitudinal dimension and, on average, around
200,000 individuals in the yearly cross-sectional dimension.
On January 1, 1973, an integrated reporting procedure for health, retirement and un-
employment insurance was introduced in Germany. The data collected using this process
forms the basis for the HD. The procedure requires employers to report any commence-
ment and termination of an employment relation which is subject to social security con-
tributions. Additionally, to guarantee continuity in the registration of employment histo-
ries, employers have to provide information on every ongoing employment relation which
is subject to social security payments on December 31 of every year. The information
reported by the employer at every observation includes individual characteristics, such as
gender, nationality, and educational attainment, as well as gross earnings over the past
employment spell which served as the basis for social security contributions.40 Further-
more, the HD also contains information on spells of interrupted employment relations,
like maternity leave, or obligatory military and civil service.
The HD does not contain individuals who are below the earnings threshold which
makes social security contributions compulsory, except if they have been in an employment
relation which is subject to social security contributions at an earlier stage of their career.
It further excludes the self-employed, state civil servants, and individuals who are in
compulsory military service, or alternative compulsory activities. For 1980, Herberger
and Becker (1983) estimate that the HD comprises 79 percent of the total labor force.
Apart from information available in the BS, the IAB data contains information from
a second important data source, the Leistungsempfangerdatei (LD) of the employment
o±ce. The LD contains spells for individuals who received certain bene¯t payments
from the Federal Department of Employment. These payments include unemployment
bene¯ts, unemployment assistance, and payments while participating on training and
40Accordingly, the sample is left truncated and right censored. The truncation refers to the lowest level
of earnings for which social security contributions are obligatory; the right censoring refers to the highest
level of earnings which are subject to contributions.
18re-training programs. This additional data source allows us to follow individuals also
during periods of registered non-employment. It is important to note, however, that
not all spells of registered non-employment are included in the LD. For instance, active
labor market programs (Arbeitsbescha®ungsmassnahmen) are not covered. Furthermore,
individuals have to ful¯ll certain requirements to be eligible for unemployment bene¯ts
or unemployment assistance (see above). Those who do not ful¯ll these requirements are
likewise not contained in the LD.
The IAB data set combines information on individual employees (from the BS and
the LD) with plant information. Every individual in the HD is associated to a plant with
a plant identi¯er. In a separate step and using the entire data base, information about
individuals was regrouped at the plant level. This allowed us to add plant information
to individual records contained in the IAB data. In particular, information about plant
size and the educational structure of the work force, as well as industry information, was
added. The plant-level statistics, however, concern only those individuals who are covered
by the social security system.
The Sample Retained for Analysis
From the overall data base, we extract a sample of high attachment workers. We select
male workers who are between 25 and 50 years old in 1984. We use this age group to
avoid including separations for early retirement reasons, and excluding individuals who
might not yet have ¯nished their schooling.
Although our observation window covers the period between 1975 and 1990, we con-
centrate our analysis on the last decade. The reason is that the earnings information
before 1984 is only of limited use. Until 1983, it was up to discretion of the employer
whether wages reported to the authorities contained additional payments, like holiday or
Christmas money. It was compulsory to include these payments after 1983. Additional
payments constitute a substantial part of the wage bill of German employees (around 7
percent; see Dustmann and VanSoest (1997)). Furthermore, they are likely to be cor-
related with variables like seniority, industry and ¯rm size. For these reasons we have
decided to use earnings information only for the period between 1984 and 1990.
We select all workers who have been continuously employed with the same establish-
ment for at least 4 consecutive years in 1984. Between 1984 and 1990 (the last year of
our observation window) these workers either stay with their establishment or they sepa-
rate. Temporary spells of unemployment or non employment with subsequent continued
19employment at the previous plant are not considered as separations.
We distinguish two types of separations: separations due to plant closure, and sepa-
rations for other reasons. We de¯ne a worker as a displaced worker if his separation is
related to the establishment closing down, or to a signi¯cant reduction in the number
of employees. We adopt three alternative de¯nitions: a worker is displaced if his plant
closes down within one year of his departure (de¯nition 1), within 2 years of his departure
(de¯nition 2), or if he separates from a plant whose employment contracts by at least
40 percent within two years of his departure (de¯nition 3). A plant closure occurs if the
number of employees within a plant drops to zero.41
The most strict de¯nition is the ¯rst one. By using this de¯nition, we may exclude
workers who left earlier because they foresaw a closure, or who were dismissed while the
¯rm cut down on size prior to closure. The last de¯nition avoids this problem, but it
may include workers who separate for other reasons. In most of the analysis, we adopt
the second de¯nition. We use the ¯rst and last de¯nition to check the robustness of our
results. Table A1 in Appendix B describes how these measures di®er.
Another problem with the type of data we use is censoring. If individuals lose their
job, they may or may not return to the sample within the observation window. Those who
do not return may change into states not recorded by our data, like non-participation,
retirement, or self{employment and civil service; they may also leave the country. This
type of censoring is a particular problem with administrative data. The question is how
to treat censored observations. Analyses of non-employment duration, or re-employment
probabilities, are sensitive to the de¯nition of the underlying sample, and have also to
be understood in that light. We decided not to impose any restrictions; results should
therefore be understood as referring to the whole population of workers conditional on
separation or displacement.
For illustrative purposes, we used information about whether individuals claim unem-
ployment insurance or unemployment assistance after separations as a device to sort out
individuals with a high likelihood of leaving the sample. After at least 4 years of con-
tinuous employment (which is one of our criteria to enter the sample), every individual
is in principle eligible for both types of bene¯ts. Workers who intend to return to the
labor market are most likely to claim bene¯ts. We single out workers who do not return
to the sample after separation and who do not claim bene¯ts. Appendix E splits up the
41While we observe separations of workers at the exact date of occurrence, information on plant size
is measured at a ¯xed date each year. Plant size refers to employment in June of the relevant year.
Accordingly, the time of closure can not be exactly dated.
20total sample of workers who separate from a ¯rm into those who return into employment
within the observation window (74 percent) and those who do not return into the sample
within the observation window (26 percent). Of those who do not return, 30.6 percent
claim bene¯ts.
Appendix F displays sample statistics of worker characteristics for the year 1984, where
we distinguish between workers continuously employed between 1980 and 1990, workers
whose ¯rst separation between 1984 and 1990 was a displacement (where displacement
refers to separation from a plant within two years of the plant closing down), and workers
whose ¯rst separation between 1984 and 1990 was for unknown reasons.
The numbers in the table indicate that average gross daily earnings of workers who
are in continuous employment over the entire period are higher than those of workers who
separate for unknown reasons and for workers who are displaced. Continuously employed
workers have also a higher seniority in 1984, with more than 44 percent being with their
¯rm for more than 9 years (as compared to 27 percent for displaced workers, and 24 for
workers who separate for unknown reasons). Interesting are the numbers on plant size,
which we measure in 1982, two years before any closure can take place in our sample.
The average plant size for continuously employed workers is 3086, as compared to 1653
for other separations, and 160 for displacements. Accordingly, workers who are displaced
according to our de¯nition separate predominantly from small ¯rms. The distributions
are not symmetric, as indicated by a comparison between the median and the mean.
4 The Incidence of Displacement in France and Ger-
many
We address the question of the rate of incidence of permanent job loss, or displacement, in
our data by two approaches. First, we look at the share of observations that correspond
to displacements and separations for other reasons in our data, and then we estimate
probit models of the incidence of displacements and other separations. We follow di®erent
approaches for the two countries.
For France, we consider the share of individuals in a given year that experience each
sort of separation. Table 1 breaks annual incidence for our sample down by year, whereas
we restrain our attention to the 1984 sample year for the decomposition of the incidence
of separation and the estimation of its determinants in tables 2 and 3. This is because
all individuals in the 1984 sample year have at least 4 years of seniorirty on their ¯rst
21job that year, whereas individuals observed in later years may be on post-separation jobs
with low senioirty, and thus the distribution of job types in later years will not necessarily
be comparable with that of the year on which the sample selection criterion was applied.
For Germany, we split our sample into three groups: Those who are continuously
employed with the same ¯rm over the entire period between 1980 and 1990 (32594 indi-
viduals), those whose ¯rst separation (after 1984) is a displacement (3273 individuals),
and those whose ¯rst separation (after 1984) is a separation for unknown reasons (12933
individuals). In table 4, we display characteristics of these three samples, where the
decomposition is by variables measured in 1984. In table 5, we estimate simple probabil-
ity models, which relate the probabilities to be in any of the three groups to individual
characteristics, again measured in 1984.
4.1 France
Table 1 below describes the incidence of permanent separation,42 i.e. the share of indi-
viduals in a given year experiencing a given type of permanent separation, in our data
for all unique individual-year combinations. Note that, as we are aggregating jobs to the
individual-year level, a person can experience both displacements and other separations in
the same year, and as such the sum of the number of individual-years with displacements
and other separations may exceed the number of individual years with any separation.
This table covers all separations that occur in our sample window, and not just ¯rst sep-
arations, since (as noted above) considering only ¯rst separations would bias our sample
increasingly towards stable individuals in the later years, and thereby seriously underes-
timate the incidence of separation towards the end of our sample window. The spike in
1989 is due to the fact that we are missing data from 1990 (see section 3), and our coding
algorithm would attribute all changes in employer identi¯er between 1989 and 1991 to
the 1989 observation year, whereas at least some changes in employer certainly occurred
during the (missing) 1990 observation year.43 We include women as a reference, although
in what follows we restrict our attention to men.
42Recall that we are only looking at permanent separations in this paper, and thus individuals who
spend less than a full calendar year on temporary layo® are not considered as separators.
43The discussion that follows supposes that the separations attributed to 1989 were more or less evenly
distributed between 1989 and 1990.
22Table 1 : Incidence of Permanent Separation by Year - France
Total Total Total Other Separations Displaced
Year Observations Separations Displacements Separations in Total in Total
Men
1984 99479 8309 2821 5584 8.35 2.84
1985 95842 8620 3487 5244 8.99 3.64
1986 93009 8730 3365 5478 9.39 3.62
1987 90458 10517 3633 7000 11.63 4.02
1988 86749 8439 3557 5006 9.73 4.10
1989 85317 15459 6349 9380 18.12 7.44
§ 550854 60074 23212 37649 10.91 4.21
Women
1984 57595 5274 2142 3172 9.16 3.72
1985 54588 5113 2044 3119 9.37 3.74
1986 52267 5275 2245 3069 10.09 4.30
1987 50226 5094 1895 3242 10.14 3.77
1988 48699 4790 1888 2961 9.84 3.88
1989 47465 8184 3301 5010 17.24 6.95
§ 310840 33730 13515 20573 10.85 4.35
Sources: Author's calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.
We ¯nd that the incidence of separation increased in France to a peak at 1987 for both
men and women, and then declined of the remainder of the sample window. Whereas the
share of individuals experiencing displacements likely peaked in 1988 for men, the ¯gures
for women suggest a peak around 1986. The increase for men towards the end of the
sample is likely related to the onset of the recession that began in the early 1990s,44
while the peak for women in 1986 corresponds to the slump that began in mid 1986 and
ran through spring 1987. Furthermore, there seem to be no major, consistent di®erences
between men and women over the entire sample period in terms of either the share of
separations in the total or the share of displacements. Since maternity leave, albeit
generous by North American standards,45 typically does not last longer than a full calendar
year, and since women are guaranteed a job with their previous employer upon returning
44Recall that we are using separations in the 2 calendar years preceding the calendar year in which the
¯rm identi¯er disappears as our criterion for distinguishing displacements from other separations.
45Women in France are guaranteed 8 weeks of maternity leave by law, of which 2 are intended to
be taken before childbirth and 6 after. However, collective agreements often extend the durations of
available maternity leave, sometimes to 16 weeks or more. Furthermore, the employment relation is not
interrupted because of maternity leave, and the woman is guaranteed a comparable position to the one
she left upon returning from maternity leave.
23from maternity leave, such a lack of di®erences in separation and displacement rates is
less surprising.
Table 2 presents a similar breakdown of our data, aggregated to the individual-year
level, by seniority on the lost job and by age, all measured in the 1984 data year. As
96 individuals experienced both a displacement and an other separation, we only count
the ¯rst separation in the top half of the table, since the elimination of multiple job
holders implies that the second separations are from low seniority jobs that follow the
¯rst separation.
Table 2 : Incidence of Permanent Separation by Previous Seniority and Age - France, 1984
Total Total Total Other Separations Displaced Displaced in
Obs. Separations Displacements Separations in Total in Total Separations
4 ·Seniority< 6 19920 2488 728 1760 12.49 3.65 29.26
6 ·Seniority< 8 24026 2235 753 1482 9.30 3.13 33.69
8 ·Seniority< 10 2791 259 124 135 9.28 4.44 47.88
10 · Seniority 52742 3327 1163 2164 6.31 2.21 34.96
§ 99479 8309 2768 5541 8.35 2.78 33.31
25 · Age < 30 11963 1135 406 752 9.49 3.39 35.77
30 · Age < 35 26154 2267 765 1523 8.67 2.92 33.75
35 · Age < 40 19431 1553 539 1034 7.99 2.77 34.71
40 · Age < 45 20400 1560 528 1043 7.65 2.59 33.85
45 · Age < 50 14322 1112 351 774 7.76 2.45 31.56
50 · Age < 55 7209 682 232 458 9.46 3.22 34.02
§ 99479 8309 2821 5584 8.35 2.84 33.95
Sources: Author's calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level. Numbers
refer to 1984 data year. 96 individual experienced both displacements and other separations in 1984. Only
the ¯rst separation is counted in the displacements and other separations columns in the top half of the table,
as the second separations are from (by construction) low seniority jobs.
Table 2 shows that, although there is a clear decline in the share of separations in
total observations and the share of displacements in total observations with previous
job seniority in France (with the exception of the relative underpopulated 8-10 years
of seniority category),46 the share of separations represented by displacements (de¯ned
as separations in the two calendar years preceding the calendar year of ¯rm closure) is
relatively invariant to seniority, and may even be slightly increasing.
46These results concerning incidence of displacement are comparable to the studies cited by Fallick
(1996), who notes that job seniority is negatively related to the incidence of displacement in the United
States.
24Although the share of displacements and separations in the total seems reasonable by
North American standards, the share of separations attributed to the displaced category
is quite high. This is likely due to two main reasons. First, given the sampling frames
in our data, most departures from small ¯rms will be classed as displacements, since the
chances of observing another sampled individual in the ¯rm, or observing ¯rm ¯nancial
data, after the separation are very low. Second, we are classifying separations occurring in
a relatively long window preceding the calendar year of ¯rm death as displacements. This
approach will mislabel all separations that occur within the window but are independent of
the ¯rm's impending demise as displacements. Unfortunately, given our data constraints,
there is little we can do about these problems.
A ¯nal point worth noting in table 2 is that the share of individuals experiencing
a displacement, or any sort of separation, is highest for the youngest and oldest age
categories. Given that younger workers are less stable than older workers, the results for
young people are not surprising. Despite our restraining our attention to workers who are
at most 50 years old in 1984, it may be the case that some of these workers' employers
o®er exceptional early retirement plans that could explain the results for older workers.47
For this reason (as mentioned in section 3 above), we impose an additional control for
early retirement in our analyses for post-separation nonemployment durations.
In order to get a more precise view of the determinants of displacement, we estimate
probit models of the incidence of 1) displacement, 2) other types of separation and 3)
all separations combined on our data from 1984. The reference category is all alternative
states (other separations and no separations for model 1, displacements and no separations
for model 2, and no separations for model 3). Constraining ourselves to 1984 data provides
us with estimates of thedeterminants of annual probabilities ofeach sort of separation, and
has the advantage of substantially reducing the risk of separations into early retirement,
as the oldest workers at this date are 50 years old. Table 3 presents the results of these
models.48
47The fact that the share of displacements in total separations is lower for 50-55 year olds than for
35-40 year olds suggests that the phenomenon generating the additional separations is not necessarily
linked to ¯rm closure.
48Appendix G presents the results of a similar estimation, but where the reference group is only those
workers who remain continuously employed with the same employer throughout the 1984-1989 sample
window.
25Table 3: Probit Models of Incidence of Separation, Total and by Type of Separation
Relative to All Alternative States - France, 1984
Displacements Other Separations All Separations
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age -0.0048 0.0136 -0.0077 0.0108 -0.0065 0.0096
Age2/100 0.0081 0.0177 0.0146 0.0139 0.0126 0.0124
4 · Seniority < 6 0.1400 0.0224 0.3563 0.0173 0.3236 0.0155
6 · Seniority < 8 0.1016 0.0215 0.1849 0.0170 0.1784 0.0150
8 · Seniority < 10 0.1378 0.0463 0.0194 0.0436 0.0884 0.0362
Elementary School -0.0895 0.0689 -0.0047 0.0550 -0.0326 0.0487
Junior High School 0.0918 0.1020 0.0185 0.0852 0.0584 0.0743
High School 0.1011 0.1262 0.1022 0.1013 0.0783 0.0912
Basic Vocational School -0.0748 0.0658 -0.1150 0.0541 -0.1113 0.0474
Advanced Vocational School -0.2412 0.1184 -0.0812 0.0846 -0.1472 0.0767
Undergraduate 0.1072 0.1185 0.1829 0.0911 0.1787 0.0821
Graduate School & Grande Ecole -0.0696 0.1114 0.3318 0.0772 0.2452 0.0711
Constant -2.2219 0.2755 -1.6680 0.2144 -1.5684 0.1911
N. Obs. 99479 99479 99479
Log Likelihood -12251.04 -20885.75 -27551.54
Source: Authors' calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Estimates include data from 1984 only, aggregated to one observation per individual.
All models also include controls for previous seniority, sector (15 categories) and skill level
(3 categories). Reference groups: No educational certi¯cation and 10 or more years of seniority.
Models estimate probability of speci¯ed type of separation relative to all alternative situations.
Table 3 suggests that the highest educational categories are the most likely to separate
for reasons other than ¯rm closure, while the only diploma that a®ects displacement is an
advanced vocational education (which reduces the risk of displacement relative to those
without any educational certi¯cation). The probability of both displacement and other
sorts of separations is not signi¯cantly related to age in 1984, a result which has also been
found for the United States (Seitchik 1991). However, the most senior workers are clearly
less likely to experience a separation, ceteris paribus, among the workers in our sample.
Although the di®erences between 4-6, 6-8 and 8-10 years of seniority are not signi¯cant
between these categories, all have a signi¯cantly higher probability of experiencing a
displacement than workers with 10 or more years of seniority. These results are consistent
with table 2 and further reinforce the idea that the incidence of worker displacement
is declining in the seniority of the worker. Similar results are found for workers with
4-8 years of seniority (relative to 10 and above) when considering separations for other
reasons. Many theoretical models predict a decline in mobility with job senioirty, so this
result is not surprising.
264.2 Germany
In Table 4 we report numbers on continuously employed workers over the period 1980-1990
(our reference group), and the number of displaced workers, and workers who separate
for unknown reasons during our sample window.49 Recall that our selection criterion is
that all workers joined the plant in 1980 or earlier. Seniority and age refer to 1984.
Table 4 : Breakdown of Separations by Type and Seniority, Germany
1 2 3 4 5 6
Continuously Total Other Total Displaced in Displaced
Employed Separations Separations Displacements Separations in Total
4 · Seniority < 6 5246 4285 3596 689 16.07 7.23
6 · Seniority < 8 4505 3009 2395 614 20.40 8.17
8 · Seniority < 10 8539 4913 3806 1107 22.53 8.23
10 · Seniority 14304 3999 3136 863 21.58 4.72
§ 32594 16206 12933 3273 20.19 6.71
25 · Age < 30 4066 2686 2214 472 17.57 6.99
30 · Age < 40 10746 5921 4795 1126 19.01 6.76
40 · Age < 50 14830 6243 4870 1373 21.99 6.52
50 · Age 2952 1356 1054 302 22.27 7.01
§ 32594 16206 12933 3273 20.19 6.71
Source: Authors' calculations from IAB data.
Notes: Seniority and age refer to 1984.
Columns 1 and 2 report the total number of continuously employed workers, and the
total number of workers who separate from their ¯rm between 1984 and 1990. Columns
3 and 4 break separations in column 2 down into separations for unknown reasons and
separations due to a plant closure (which we label displacements). The last two columns
report the percentage of displacements among all separations, and among all workers. The
¯rst panel distinguishes between di®erent seniority levels, and the second panel between
di®erent age groups. Our sample consists of a total of 32594 continuously employed
workers, 12933 workers who separate for unknown reasons, and 3273 workers who separate
due to plant closure (according to de¯nition 2, see above).
On average, 6.71 percent of all workers who have been in continuous employment with
one ¯rm between 1980 and 1984 experience a separation between 1984 and 1990 because
the plant closes down. This percentage is slightly higher at the lower seniority levels, and
49Our distinction between displaced and separated workers refers to the reason for the ¯rst separation
after being in continuous employment between 1980 and 1984.
27lower at the higher seniority levels, indicating that plants which close down tend to have
workers with lower levels of seniority. One reason may be that these plants are younger.
There is no clear age pattern. Displaced workers account for 20.19 percent of the sample
of separated workers.
Among the continuously employed workers, 44 percent have been with the same plant
for at least 10 years in 1984; for displaced workers and workers who separate for unknown
reasons, this number is lower: 26 percent and 24 percent respectively. Accordingly, al-
though we used the same selection criterion to construct our samples (to have been with
the same ¯rm for at least 4 years in 1984), the distribution of seniority di®ers according
to their future separation status. The age distribution is more similar between the three
groups, with more than 70 percent of workers concentrated in the age range between 30
and 50.
To investigate the e®ect of observables on the separation and displacement probability
in ¯ner detail, we estimate simple probit models, where the dependent variable is equal
to one if the individual is displaced (column 1) or separated for unknown reasons (column
2) over the period 1984-1990.50 The values of regressors refer to 1983, the last year before
a separation could take place. The benchmark group are workers who are continuously
employed with the same ¯rm between 1980 and 1990. Results are displayed in table 5,
where marginal e®ects, calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables, are reported.
50Recall that separation status refers to the ¯rst separation only.
28Table 5: Probability of Displacement/Separation,
1984-1990; Germany (Marginal E®ects)
Displacements Other Separations
Marg. E®ect Std. Err. Marg. E®ect Std. Err.
Age/100 0.005 0.020 -0.238 0.030
5 · Seniority<7 0.003 0.004 -0.039 0.006
7 · Seniority<9 -0.014 0.003 -0.088 0.005
9 · Seniority -0.035 0.003 -0.153 0.005
Apprentice, No High School 0.008 0.003 -0.006 0.005
No Apprentice, High School -0.023 0.019 0.052 0.032
Apprentice, High School 0.016 0.015 0.046 0.020
Polytechnic -0.028 0.007 0.061 0.012
University -0.018 0.009 0.141 0.014
Education Unknown 0.026 0.008 0.053 0.011
Sec2: Energy -0.085 0.001 -0.189 0.014
Sec3: Mining -0.062 0.005 0.119 0.031
Sec4: Manufacturing -0.146 0.012 -0.092 0.022
Sec5: Construction -0.038 0.007 -0.001 0.023
Sec6: Distributional Services -0.063 0.006 -0.004 0.023
Sec7: Industry Services -0.078 0.003 -0.055 0.021
Sec8: Consumer Services -0.069 0.003 -0.081 0.024
Sec9: Public Services -0.101 0.003 -0.112 0.019
N. Obs. 36689 44402
Probability 0.086 0.244
Source: Authors' calculations from IAB data.
Note: All estimations refer to 1983. Excluded categories: Agricultural sector,
no apprenticeship, no high school and 3 ·seniority< 5. Comparison group:
Continuously employed in same plant, 1984-1990.
We ¯rst discuss displacement. The estimates compare characteristics of workers in
plants which close down between 1984 and 1990 with characteristics of workers in plants
which do not; this is conditional on the two groups being employed for at least 4 years in
1984, and the latter group being employed between 1980 and 1990 with the same plant.
Age has a non-signi¯cant e®ect on the displacement probability. This may be inter-
preted as an indication that the age structure of workers in ¯rms which close down is not
di®erent from that that of the reference group. The displacement probability decreases
slightly with seniority { workers a®ected by a closure over the 1984-1990 window are
characterised by less tenure than workers who are not. The benchmark for the education
categories are workers without apprenticeship and without high school degree. The neg-
ative signs of higher education dummies indicate that the skill mix of workers a®ected
29by displacement is weighted toward lower education groups, compared to our reference
group.
The results in the second column are quite di®erent. Remember that workers separated
for unknown reasons include workers who are ¯red for cause, as well as workers who quit.
Age has now a strong and negative e®ect. This is to be expected, given that age should
a®ect the separation probabilities for both groups of workers in this category negatively:
First, ¯ring of workers becomes more expensive the older they are because of institutional
regulations. Second, age is positively related to the match quality, and mobility of workers
decreases with age. Unlike displaced workers, higher education now has a positive e®ect
on the separation probability. This may indicate a higher degree of mobility for the well
educated.
5 Durations Out of Work
In North America, displaced workers often experience periods out of work following their
displacement and prior to ¯nding another job. In the more heavily regulated labor markets
of France and Germany (see section 2), advance notice requirements are meant to reduce
or eliminate periods out of work. The analysis of nonemployment durations following
displacement in France and Germany may provide additional insight into the functioning
of the labor markets in thesecountries, and into the rolethat di®erences in theinstitutional
environment might play in determining the speed of re-employment. In both countries,
we focus on the ¯rst separation that occurs within our sample windows.
5.1 France
Table 6 breaks down all ¯rst separations in our data by seniority, and describes the share
of separations which are followed by a period out of work. This is further broken down
into displacements and other sorts of separations.
30Table 6: Non-Employment Spells after First Separation by Seniority - France
1 2 3 4 5 6
All % Nonemp % Nonemp Other % Nonemp
Seniority Separations Spell Displacements Spell Separations Spell
4 · Seniority < 6 1699 85.40 437 79.63 1262 87.40
6 · Seniority < 8 2912 84.38 802 81.92 2110 85.31
8 · Seniority < 10 2685 83.99 762 82.94 1923 84.40
10 · Seniority 8998 79.06 2406 74.44 6592 80.75
P
16294 81.48 4407 77.79 11887 82.86
Sources: Authors' calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Column 1: Total Number of Separations, by Seniority. Column 2: Percentage of nonemployment
spells in total. Columns 3, 5: Number of Displacements and Other Separations. Columns 4, 6: Percentages
of Displacements and Other Separations that are followed by positive duration nonemployment spells.
Statistics include only ¯rst separations and impose the retirement constraint (see section 3).
The numbers in table 6 demonstrate that the percentage of those who experience a
nonemployment spell after separating from the ¯rm declines with seniority in France.
Furthermore, the share of positive-duration nonemployment spells is lower in general for
displaced workers than for workers who separate for unknown reasons, with the di®erence
being the most °agrant for the least senior workers.
Overall, table 6 shows that approximately 22 percent of workers who lose stable jobs
because of ¯rm closure never experience an interruption in their employment histories as
a result of their displacement. This may be due to the employment protection legislation
described in section 2 above. In fact, given the rigidity of the employment protection
legislation and the long advance notice periods it implies, one might wonder why the
share of direct transitions is not higher. This is likely due to the length of the window
used for de¯ning displacement (see section 3), which includes separations that are not
necessarily related to the ¯rm closure and thus do not necessarily bene¯t from such
generous employment protection legislation.
To get a sense of the duration of nonemployment spells when they do occur, ¯gure
1 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the nonparametric survival functions of post-
separation nonemployment spells for all spells of positive duration. Note that these results
are conditional on experiencing a nonemployment spell of positive length, and that (as
is always the case in duration modeling) our estimates are sensitive to the treatment of
censored observations.51
51In France, we treat all spells that do not end before December 31, 1989 as censored.


































Figure 1 shows that displaced workers clearly leave nonemployment at a faster rate
than workers who separate for other reasons. These di®erences are highlighted by the dif-
ferences in long-term nonemployment between displaced workers and those who separate
for other reasons. In France, less than 20 percent of displaced workers who experience
a nonemployment spell are still without employment 5 years after displacement, while
over 33 percent of workers who separate for reasons other than ¯rm closure and enter
nonemployment are without a job 5 years after separation.52
Of course, the di®erences between displaced workers and other separators in France
may only be super¯cial, as the Kaplan-Meier survivor functions we have drawn in ¯gure
1 do not consider the di®erences in the characteristics of the two populations. It may
simply be the case that other separators have characteristics that make ¯nding a new
job harder after separation than displaced workers, and thus these workers would take
longer to ¯nd new jobs independent of the reason for the separation. To control for
observable heterogeneity in the populations, we estimate durations of nonemployment by
52Informal discussions with ASSEDIC administrators suggests that, in 1998 at least, approximately
one third of individuals drawing unemployment insurance exhausted their bene¯ts. These ¯gures are
roughly consistent with the survivor function measured a decade earlier shown in ¯gure 1.
32using proportional hazard models with Weibull-distributed baseline hazards in France.53
The e®ects of di®erent covariates on nonemployment durations following separations are
given in table 7 for workers with at least 4 years of seniority on the job of their ¯rst
separation.54 We estimate models with 1) both types of workers and an indicator variable
for ¯rm closure, as well as separately for 2) displaced workers and 3) workers who separate
for other reasons. The ¯rst speci¯cation is equivalent to imposing an identical baseline
hazard and identical coe±cients on all covariates except the constant across the second
and third speci¯cations.
53The estimated Kaplan-Meier hazards underlying ¯gure 1 are roughly linear and decreasing in the log
of the hazard rate, which suggests that a Weibull distributed baseline hazard is the most appropriate
parametric speci¯cation. Semiparamteric (Cox) models were not estimable under the material constraints
(memory allocation and CPU time) imposed by INSEE.
54Note that, since the parameter estimates refer to the proportionality factor in the hazard function,
a positive coe±cient means that higher levels of the corresponding variable are associated with higher
values of the hazard function, and thus shorter expected nonemployment durations.
33Table 7: Weibull Proportional Hazard Models - France
All Separated for
Separations Unknown Reason Displaced
Variable Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E.
Constant -1.4272 0.2757 -1.5000 0.3018 -0.3903 205.6546
6 · Seniority < 8 -0.4538 0.1306 -0.4079 0.1429 -0.5210 0.1772
8 · Seniority < 10 -0.4928 0.1389 -0.4261 0.1528 -0.5817 0.1858
10 · Seniority -0.4807 0.1276 -0.4106 0.1398 -0.5827 0.1719
Firm Closure 0.2081 0.1049
Age 0.0080 0.0286 0.0064 0.0317 0.0102 0.0382
Elementary School 0.2461 0.2101 0.3020 0.2333 0.1395 0.2776
Junior High School 0.2906 0.2570 0.4343 0.2743 -0.0313 0.3860
High School 0.6020 0.2685 0.6739 0.2967 0.5216 0.3601
Basic Vocational School 0.3829 0.2042 0.5054 0.2287 0.1283 0.2670
Advanced Vocational School 0.4219 0.2530 0.5048 0.2708 0.2810 0.3744
Undergraduate 1.0114 0.2611 1.4623 0.2940 0.1666 0.3535
Graduate School & Grande Ecole 0.6371 0.2459 0.6628 0.2679 0.5379 0.3411
1985 -0.0187 0.1192 -0.0825 0.1307 0.1043 0.1633
1986 0.1601 0.1267 0.0811 0.1381 0.3163 0.1746
1987 0.2202 0.1302 0.1505 0.1422 0.3519 0.1782
1988 0.1938 0.1395 0.1367 0.1529 0.2986 0.1897
1989 0.2968 0.1462 0.1606 0.1613 0.5577 0.1984
Weibull Shape Parameter 0.4335 0.4311 0.4464
Number of Observations 13838 10136 3702
Number of Failures 8350 5698 2652
Log Likelihood -25937.53 -18134.16 -7701.72
Source: Authors' calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 31, 1989.
All models included controls for sector of preseparation ¯rm (15 categories) and skill level
(3 categories). Reference groups: 1984, 4-6 years of seniority and no educational certi¯cation.
Table 7 shows that the shape parameter of the Weibull model is always less than 1,
indicating that the conditional probability of leaving unemployment decreases over time
(decreasing hazard). This is consistent with the nonparametric hazard underlying ¯gure
1. The results in column 1 show that individuals who separate because of a closure
have a higher conditional probability of re-entering employment than individuals who are
separated for other reasons. This can be explained by the set of individuals in the samples
we are analyzing; since we only consider individuals who experience a non employment
spell of positive duration, the group of workers who separate for other reasons may now
consist mainly of workers who were ¯red for cause.55
55The layo®s and lemons model of Gibbons and Katz (1991) predicts such a phenomenon.
34Seniority in the pre-separation ¯rm seems to slow exit from nonemployment in France
for both sorts of separations, and this e®ect seems slightly stronger for displaced workers
(relative to those who separate for other reasons). In general, most types of education
seem to help workers leave nonemployment faster, relative to workers without any degree,
although which degrees help the most varies by reason for separation. For displaced
workers, those with an advanced vocational school, graduate school or grande ¶ ecole degree
¯nd new jobs the fastest, while among workers who separate for reasons other than ¯rm
closure, the degrees that count are a high school baccalaur¶ eat, an undergraduate, grande
¶ ecole or graduate school degree (the vocational degrees are marginally less important).
The results for displaced workers suggest the importance of a being able to signal a
particular competency after one's ¯rm closes via an advanced vocational certi¯cation or a
relatively specialized graduate degree. One explanation could be that since ¯rm closure is
such a dramatic event, when a ¯rm closes it may be the sign of ill health in the industry in
general. As such, workers who are able to point to advanced skills may ¯nd it easier to get
new jobs than those whose abilities are more closely linked to their previous employer's
industry. The results for other separators may re°ect the value that a more general
education might have in counterbalancing the negative signal sent by a ¯ring for cause,
as well as the extensive networks that some grandes ¶ ecoles have available to help place
their alumni who might otherwise have di±culty.
5.2 Germany
Table 8 reports the number andthepercentageof workers who experience a non-employment
spells in Germany. On average, about 50 percent of workers who separate from their ¯rm
immediately ¯nd another job. The number is slightly lower for displaced workers (39.5
percent), and slightly higher for workers who separate for unknown reasons (51.6 percent).
The likelihood of a non-employment spell decreases slightly with job tenure, in particular
for displaced workers.
35Table 8: Non-Employment Spells after Separation by Seniority - Germany
1 2 3 4 5 6
All % Nonemp % Nonemp Other % Nonemp
Seniority Separations Spell Displacements Spell Separations Spell
4 · Seniority < 6 1749 54.94 281 51.60 1468 55.58
6 · Seniority < 8 2422 50.28 458 46.28 1964 51.22
8 · Seniority < 10 3977 52.07 863 44.38 3114 54.30
10 · Seniority 8043 46.15 16721 33.01 6371 49.59
P
16191 49.16 3274 39.46 12917 51.62
Sources: Authors' calculations from IAB data.
Notes: Column 1: Total Number of Separations, by Seniority. Column 2: Percentage of nonemployment
spells in total. Columns 3, 5: Number of Displacements and Other Separations. Columns 4, 6: Percentages
of Displacements and Other Separations that are followed by positive duration nonemployment spells.
Figures on non-employment include all individuals who do not experience a job-to-job
transition, including individuals who leave the labor force into other states (see discus-
sion above). The numbers are therefore not directly interpretable as the percentage of
individuals who experience non employment after a separation and would like to remain
in the labor market. Figures for this type of worker will generally be lower.
Next, we investigate the duration of spells of nonemployment for those individuals who
experienced a nonemployment spell after separation. Figure 2 shows the Kaplan-Meier
estimates of the survival functions of post-separation nonemployment spells for all spells
of positive duration. Observations are treated as censored if they have not re-entered the
work force at the end of the observation window (December 1990). The graphs indicate
that displaced workers leave nonemployment at a faster rate than workers who separate
for other reasons.
In order to learn about the relation between individual characteristics and the condi-
tional probability of re-entering employment after a separation and conditional on having
had a non-employment spell, we estimate durations of nonemployment using Cox models,
which avoid parametric assumptions about the baseline hazard. The e®ect of di®erent
covariates on nonemployment durations following separation are given in table 9. We
estimate the models separately for displaced workers and workers who separate for other
reasons.
36Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions - Germany
Months out of work














37Table 9: Cox Models - Germany
All Separated for
Separations Unknown Reason Displaced
Variable Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E.
Age/100 -3.1258 0.2257 -3.5590 0.2599 -1.8075 0.4644
6 · Seniority < 8 0.0310 0.0571 0.0293 0.0641 0.0801 0.1286
8 · Seniority < 10 0.0641 0.0532 0.0340 0.0602 0.2053 0.1178
10 · Seniority -0.0217 0.0617 -0.1062 0.0703 0.2880 0.1324
Closure 0.4035 0.0388
Apprentice, No High School 0.3749 0.0407 0.4084 0.046 0.2669 0.0826
No Apprentice, High School 0.1485 0.3041 0.1886 0.3367 -0.0092 0.7159
Apprentice, High School 0.0099 0.1709 0.3215 0.1936 -0.6717 0.3636
Polytechnic 0.1972 0.1309 0.3311 0.1421 -0.2354 0.3427
University 0.0879 0.1276 0.1994 0.1302 -1.8720 1.0043
Education Unknown 0.0524 0.0721 0.0764 0.0842 -0.0361 0.1404
1985 0.1230 0.0486 0.1528 0.0565 0.0886 0.0967
1986 0.2224 0.0549 0.2278 0.0629 0.2249 0.1143
1987 0.1694 0.0621 0.2408 0.0709 -0.0342 0.1305
1988 0.1709 0.0696 0.2146 0.0796 0.0635 0.1438
1989 0.1533 0.0784 0.2347 0.0884 -0.0739 0.1734
1990 -0.0167 0.1027 -0.0879 0.1171 0.6807 0.2101
Number of Observations 5019 3998 1021
Number of Failures 3720 2813 907
Log Likelihood -28924.35 -21269.33 -5557.59
Source: Authors' calculations from IAB data.
Notes: Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December
1990. Reference group: No Apprenticeship, no high school.
In the ¯rst model, we do not distinguish between the two types of separation. We
include an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if separation is due to closure. As already
indicated by the Kaplan Meier estimates, workers who are displaced and experience a
subsequent non-employment spell are more rapidly reabsorbed by the labor market than
workers who separate for other reasons. This latter group is likely to include primarily
workers who were dismissed for cause, since workers who quit because they received a
better outside o®ers are unlikely to experience non-employment spells after separation.
The seniority variables refer to seniority prior to separation. Seniority plays no role
in changing the rate of exit from nonemployment for workers who are displaced for un-
known reasons, but it increases the conditional probability of a return into work for
displaced workers. Recall that seniority also reduces the probability of experiencing a
non-employment spell for these workers. Age has a negative e®ect for both groups, indi-
cating that older workers ¯nd it more di±cult to receive a job o®er than younger ones,
independently of the reason of separation. The educational indicators are marginally sig-
38ni¯cant. They indicate a negative relationship between education and the conditional
probability of exit from non-employment for displaced workers. This may re°ect the
higher level of bene¯ts for educated workers.56
6 Earnings Before and After Separation
The literature notes that wage losses occur, in particular, for workers who lose jobs in
which they had a high level of seniority. It has also been noted that these wage losses
begin prior to displacement, and that measuring wage losses by comparing only the ¯nal
wage on the job from which the worker was displaced with the new wage is likely to
underestimate the size of these losses. In this section, we describe the time paths of daily
earnings and changes in earnings growth in the years surrounding separations.
6.1 France
Figure 3 plots average daily earnings for French workers who were continuously employed
over the at-risk period (1984-1989), workers whose ¯rst separation was a displacement
during that period and workers whose ¯rst separation was for another reason during that
period. We only include individuals with strictly positive average daily earnings for our
calculations.57 For expository purposes, we look in particular at individuals whose ¯rst
separation took place in 1987 (if at all). We consider separations from all years combined
starting with table 10 below.
In France, average daily earnings increased faster between 1986 and 1988 for work-
ers displaced in 1987 than for workers who were continuously employed over the entire
1984-1989 period with the same employer and for those whose ¯rst separation was in 1987
and for reasons other than ¯rm closure. Average real daily earnings grew by 2.01% for
continuously employed workers between 1986 and 1988 and by 7.80% for other separators
56Bene¯t payments are proportional to the most recent earnings prior to separation (see section 2.1).
57Jacobson et al. (1993), on the other hand, suppose that workers not in employment after separation
have zero earnings, and keep these workers in the sample for the calculation of their average earnings
changes.

















































over the same interval,58 while average daily earnings jumped by 16.43% for displaced
workers across the 1986-1988 interval. Part of this might be due to what is called \partial
unemployment" in the period leading up to ¯rm closure. In France, a ¯rm can negotiate a
contract with the unemployment insurance fund to put its workers on partial unemploy-
ment, in which case the worker receives a ¯xed fraction of his or her initial salary with
the costs split between the employer and the unemployment insurance fund. The worker
does not report to work, but maintains the employment relation. If employers report
only the (lower) share of the (lower) workers' earnings paid during this period while not
reducing the reported number of days for which compensation was paid, this would arti-
¯cially lower the pre-displacement earnings level. However, ¯gure 3 does not show such a
pre-separation drop in relative earnings, and even if such a phenomenon were present, it
seems unlikely that average daily earnings in France decline around separation.59
58Note that the earnings change for other separators combines individuals who left their jobs for better
outside o®ers with workers who were ¯red for cause and workers who were laid o® from ¯rms that did
not shut down within the following 2 calendar years.
59One might ask why displaced workers did not leave earlier if they were going to have such large
earnings gains associated with changing employers. There are several possible explanations. First, the
employment protection legislation provided them with job security on their previous employer that they
stood to lose if they changed earlier. However, the prospect of imminent ¯rm closure reduces the value
40Another interesting point to draw from ¯gure 3 is the order of earnings levels between
the three categories. It appears that in the time before separation, displaced workers have
earnings that are, on average, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously
employed or separated for other reasons than displacement. Workers who separate from
their employers in France for the ¯rst time (in the 1984-1989 window) by displacement
in 1987 earn 11.8 percent less in 1984 than those whose ¯rst separation is for other
reasons, who in turn earn 1.3 percent less than workers who are continuously employed
over the whole period. During the period preceding separation, there seems to be very
littledi®erence between continuously employed workers and thosewho separatefor reasons
other than displacement, while throughout this period displaced workers earn less. Still, in
the period immediately after the separation, average daily earnings for displaced workers
who have found new jobs have almost completely caught up with continously employed
workers, being only 1.2 percent below, and workers who separate for other reasons and
are employed in the year after separation pull ahead of continuously employed workers,
earning 3.2 percent more.
A ¯nal point worth noting is the dip in average real daily earnings between the year
following separation and two years after separation, for both displaced workers and those
who separate for other reasons. Since we are calculating the averages used to draw ¯gure
3 from employed individuals only, this dip, or rather lack of recovery, could be due to a
composition e®ect. It may be that workers who take longer to ¯nd a job after separation
earn less on their new job than those who ¯nd their new job sooner (and already have a
year of seniority). We explore this idea further below.
Table 10 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at long di®erences (of
at least 2 periods) in average daily earnings around the displacement or separation date
by seniority (prior to separation), distinguishing between continuously employed workers,
displaced workers, and workers who separate for other reasons. For the continuously
employed, the table simply provides 2-year di®erences in average earnings. For displaced
of this non-wage component of job-speci¯c utility, thus making outside o®ers relatively more attractive.
A second possible explanation is that the o®er arrival rate for on-the-job search may be lower than that
for o®-the-job search (or search during the notice period). In this case, workers whose ¯rst separation
was a displacement may simply not have received another o®er prior to their separation.
A ¯nal explanation is that 1988 was a good year for the French economy, with 3.95% GDP
growth, relative to an average of 1.51% over the 1984-1987 period (BLS Macroeconomic Statistics,
http://stats.bls.gov/°sdata.htm). As such, there may have been better outside o®ers in 1988 than in
earlier years.
41and other separated workers, the numbers refer to the earnings di®erence between the new
job in the year after the separation year (if a new job has been found, otherwise it refers
to the ¯rst year in which a new job has been found) and the old job in the year prior to
the separation year. We have further distinguished between workers who are observed in
employment at the earliest two calendar years after separation; we refer to these workers
as Slow Displaced and Slow Other Separations.
Table 10: Two Period Earnings Growth by Seniority at Date of First Separation
Continuously All Slow Other Slow Other
Employed Displaced Displaced Separations Separations
%4w Obs. %4w Obs. %4w Obs. %4w Obs %4w Obs
4 · Seniority < 6 4.70 13712 16.62 825 -9.34 175 10.43 1521 -12.02 349
6 · Seniority < 8 4.38 35453 12.22 1642 1.48 213 8.91 2180 -25.92 531
8 · Seniority < 10 3.55 31659 13.51 1375 -3.67 154 10.05 1464 -11.04 238
10 · Seniority 2.58 138298 9.87 4708 -6.07 441 3.37 4194 -23.56 556
§ 3.15 219122 11.88 8550 -4.64 983 6.85 9359 -20.12 1674
Source: Authors' calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Data correspond to one observation per indivdual per year. \Slow" refers to individuals
who were not reemployed in the calendar year following the separation.
Table 10 con¯rms the intuition derived from ¯gure 3. Considering all displacement
dates simultaneously, we ¯nd that displaced workers as a whole make faster earnings gains
than continuously employed workers or workers who separate for other reasons. Earnings
losses occur on average for both displaced and other separating workers who take more
than a year to ¯nd a new job, as indicated by ¯gure 3. Despite the fact that slow job
¯nders make up a relatively small share of workers who eventually ¯nd jobs following
separation within our sample window, it will clearly be important to distinguish them
from workers who ¯nd new jobs within the ¯rst calendar year after separation in our
earnings regressions in section 7 below.
6.2 Germany
Figure 4 plots average daily earnings for German workers who were continuously employed
over the at-risk period (1984-1990), workers whose ¯rst separation was a displacement,
and took place in 1988, and workers whose ¯rst separation was for another reason, and
took place in 1988. The separation year 1988 is omitted. Only employed individuals
contribute to the averages on which the ¯gures are based. We do not include workers who
are not employed in a given year after separation.
































       
Year
 Other Separations       Displaced             





43The ¯gure indicates that displaced and other separated workers experience earnings
growth at a rate similar to continuously employed workers between the pre- and post
separation year. Another interesting point to draw from the ¯gures is the order of average
earnings levels between the three categories. It appears that displaced workers have daily
earnings that are, on average, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously
employed or separated for other reasons than displacement.
Table 11 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at long di®erences (of at
least 2 years) in average earnings around the displacement or separation date. We distin-
guish between di®erent levels of seniority (prior to separation), and between continuously
employed workers, displaced workers, and workers who separate for other reasons. For the
continuously employed, the table simply provides 2-year di®erences in average earnings.
For displaced and separated workers, the numbers refer to the earnings di®erence between
the new job in the year after the separation occurs, and the old job in the year prior to the
separation. Obviously, this includes only workers who have found a job in the year after
separation. The columns Displaced I and Separated I report earnings growth of workers
who are observed in employment at the earliest two calendar years after separation. The
earnings data is top coded - overall, 12.7 percent of the sample is a®ected in 1983 (see
data section for details). We do not account for this in table 11, although this point is
considered explicitly in section 7 below.
Table 11: Two Period Log Earnings Growth, by Seniority
at Date of First Separation
Displaced Displaced I Displaced II
Seniority %¢w N. Obs. %¢w N. Obs. %¢w N. Obs.
4 · Seniority < 6 2.44 242 -20.43 15 0.83 89
6 · Seniority < 8 5.74 397 7.04 22 2.60 111
8 · Seniority < 10 1.93 737 -3.42 41 -2.10 190
10 · Seniority 2.36 1288 -15.45 34 -3.57 254
§ 2.75 2665 -7.29 112 -1.46 644
Separated Separated I Cont. Employed
Seniority %¢w N. Obs. %¢w N. Obs. %¢w N. Obs.
4 · Seniority < 6 4.58 1048 -8.21 102 3.50 12603
6 · Seniority < 8 4.31 1422 -12.72 107 3.98 22305
8 · Seniority < 10 2.94 1979 -13.07 135 4.82 50482
10 · Seniority 2.46 3273 -23.66 113 3.14 167374
§ 3.21 7730 -14.24 458 4.64 255331
Displaced I, Separated I: workers who have not found a job in the year
after displacement (separation). Displaced II: Workers who experience
a non-employment spell of at least 1 week after displacement.
44Table 11 indicates that average two year earnings growth for continuously employed
workers is 4.6 percent. Pre-post displacement earnings growth for displaced workers and
workers separated for unknown reasons are 2.8 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively. The
numbers con¯rm the intuition derived from ¯gure 4 that workers who separate continue
to make earnings gains. Gains have a slight tendency to decrease with seniority, but a
clear pattern is only visible for workers separated for unknown reasons.
The picture looks entirely di®erent, however, for workers who are only able to ¯nd a
job two years after displacement at the earliest (columns Displaced I and Separated I ).
Here earnings decrease substantially; they drop by 7.3 percent for displaced workers, and
by 14.2 percent for workers who separate for other reasons. The large earnings loss of the
latter group may re°ect that this group is likely to consist mainly of workers who have
been laid o® for cause.
A problem in our data is that we observe closures only at the plant level. Therefore,
some plants may disappear due to reorganization, and workers may continue to work in
the same ¯rm, but in a plant with a di®erent identi¯er. Although this event is not likely
to be frequent, it may distort our results. On the basis of the data we have available, it
is not possible to sort out these \false" plant closures.
Workers whose plants disappear because of a re-organization should appear as direct
transitions. We have therefore computed earnings losses for displaced workers who have
experienced a non-employment spell after separation lasting at least one week. This may
most likely eliminate workers who change plant numbers for reorganizational reasons.
However, it also restricts the sample to lower quality workers - workers who are not able
to ¯nd a new job immediately. Accordingly, the corresponding numbers may be seen as
lower bounds for earnings losses incurred by displacement. We report the results in the
column Displaced II. A total of 644 displaced workers experience a non-employment spell
of at least 6 days after displacement and are re-employed in the year after displacement.
Their average earnings loss is -1.46 percent. Earnings losses are clearly higher for workers
with higher levels of seniority before displacement. This may be an age e®ect, or it may
indicate the loss of ¯rm speci¯c human capital incurred by these workers.
We conclude from these numbers that average losses incurred by displacement are,
in the worst case, around 1.5 percent. Those workers who are continuously employed
experience at the same time an earnings increase of about 4.6 percent. Assuming that
this number re°ects also the earnings growth that workers who are displaced would have
experienced had their plants not closed down, the worst case scenario is that the decline
in earnings growth associated with a plant closure related displacement is 6 percent.
45However, more serious earnings losses are experienced by workers who are not able to
rejoin the labor market in the year after displacement.
7 Regression Analysis of Pre- and Post Separation
Earnings
In this section, we compare the pre- and post-separation earnings paths of displaced and
continuously employed workers more generally. As a descriptive tool, we estimate simple
earnings regressions on various subpopulations. The general estimation strategy is as
follows.60
We regress log earnings on time-invariant and time-varying individual speci¯c charac-
teristics (xi and zit), time e®ects ±t, and a vector of indicator variables kis, which switch
from 0 to 1 s years after separation, or ¡s years before separation. Depending on the
speci¯cation, the coe±cients on the kis variables measure the di®erence in the level of
earnings of workers s years before or after separation and the earnings of either continu-
ously employed workers, or the di®erence in earnings with respect to other workers who
separate for the same reason measured in a reference year,61 conditional on time e®ects
and observable individual characteristics. We also add the variables ksi¿, which take on
the value 1 in the after separation period for those individuals who are not observed in
employment in the year after separation. The parameter on these variables, », picks up a
negative permanent e®ect for those individuals who remain out of work for more than one
year after separation. Finally, uit is a disturbance term. Thus, our estimation equation is
as follows:






ksi¿ + uit; (1)
where! is the set of post separation dates and Ais theset of pre- and post-separation dates
(with or without an indicator for the year immediately preceding separation, depending
on the speci¯cation).
60Our estimation strategy resembles that on Jacobson et al. (1993).
61For France, the reference year is 5 years prior to separation. For Germany in table 13, it is the year
immediately preceding separation.
467.1 France
Table 12 provides the results of estimating this model on average daily earnings in
France.62 To ease interpretation of the results, we replace the indicator variable for 5
years before separation with an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for all indi-
viduals who separate (the variable Separated). This allows us to sweep out the average
di®erence between separators and the continuously employed, and we can interpret the
coe±cients on the other relative year indicators (Sepi ) in terms of an earnings path for
workers who separate.
Column 1 compares workers who are displaced because of plant closure between 1984
and 1989 with workers who are continuously employed over that period. Column 2 com-
pares continuously employed workers with workers who separate for unknown reasons. As
mentioned above, these latter separations consist of voluntary quits and ¯rings for cause.
The variable Perm takes on the value 1 in all years following the ¯rst separation if it
took the individual more than 12 months to ¯nd a job after displacement. As mentioned
above, the variable Separate takes on the value 1 for all workers who separate, and the
Sepi variables assume the value one in the ith year prior to or following the worker's
¯rst separation. Thus the coe±cient on Separate can be interpeted as the di®erence in
earnings 5 years prior to separation for workers who will eventually separate from their
employers relative to the continuously employed, and the coe±cients on the Sepi variables
are interpreted as variations in earnings for workers who will eventually separate relative
to their 5 years before separation earnings. Note that, as in section 6, we are considering
only the ¯rst separation as the reference in these regressions, and that we have excluded
earnings in the separation year for workers who separate. The reason is that the earnings
in the separation year may be partly comprised of pre- and post-separation employers,
and the interpretation of this coe±cient is unclear.
62See Margolis (forthcoming) for estimates of this model using log total annual earnings as a dependent
variable. Margolis (1999) estimates a similar model but with individual ¯xed e®ects.
47Table 12: Log Average Real Daily Earnings Regressions - France
Displacements Other Separations
Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E.
Separated -0.0917 0.0068 -0.0553 0.0060
Sep¡4 -0.0042 0.0084 -0.0035 0.0075
Sep¡3 -0.0121 0.0080 -0.0230 0.0069
Sep¡2 -0.0124 0.0077 -0.0256 0.0067
Sep¡1 -0.0281 0.0075 -0.0520 0.0066
Perm -0.0479 0.0109 -0.1061 0.0069
Sep1 0.1265 0.0080 0.1349 0.0073
Sep2 0.0377 0.0082 0.0255 0.0075
Sep3 0.0196 0.0086 -0.0137 0.0077
Sep4 -0.0049 0.0094 -0.0187 0.0083
Sep5 -0.0250 0.0115 -0.0162 0.0098
Age 0.0465 0.0010 0.0472 0.0010
Age2/100 -0.0440 0.0012 -0.0448 0.0012
1985 -0.0004 0.0022 -0.0006 0.0022
1986 0.0081 0.0022 0.0106 0.0022
1987 -0.0081 0.0022 -0.0050 0.0023
1988 -0.0045 0.0023 -0.0044 0.0023
1989 0.0016 0.0023 -0.0025 0.0024
Elementary School 0.0553 0.0053 0.0439 0.0055
Junior High School 0.2207 0.0080 0.2151 0.0082
High School 0.3447 0.0096 0.3533 0.0100
Basic Vocational School 0.1357 0.0051 0.1180 0.0053
Advanced Vocational School 0.2807 0.0075 0.2677 0.0077
Undergraduate 0.4108 0.0092 0.4018 0.0093
Graduate School & Grande Ecole 1.0866 0.0081 1.0687 0.0081
Constant -2.8427 0.0205 -2.8827 0.0210
N. Obs. 402174 433627
R2 0.3608 0.3339
Reference Groups: 1984, No Educational Certi¯cation. The variable
Separated equals one for all observations corresponding to individuals
who separate at some point between 1984 and 1989. The variable Perm
equals one for observations after separation if time between the 2 jobs
exceeded 1 year. The Sepi variables equal one in the ith year before/after
separation.
Table 12 shows that, even after controlling for observable individual characteristics,
workers who separate because of ¯rm closure earn 8.8% less than continuously employed
workers 5 years prior to the actual separation.63 This could be due in part to unobserved
63Note that, for a given coe±cient ¯ on a regressor x in tables 12-14, 4log(y) = ¯4x. To calculate
the percentage change in y induced by 4x, i.e.
yt+1¡yt
yt , one typically makes use of the approximation
log(1 +x) = x. This approximation is not valid when x is far from zero, and thus the coe±eicents are
48heterogeneity across individuals; i.e. individuals employed by ¯rms who will close earn
less anyway.64 Alternatively, it could be that low wage ¯rms have a higher risk of going
out of business than better paying ¯rms.65 This gap increases slightly as the displacement
date approaches, with the dip only being signi¯cant in the year immediately preceding
displacement, in which earnings of displaced workers are approximately 2.8 percent lower
than they were 5 years before displacement. Workers who separate for reasons other that
¯rm closure start with earnings closer to the continuously employed (5.4 percent below),
but the pre-separation dip starts sooner (3 years prior to separation) and is much larger,
with earnings in the year preceding separation being approximately 5.1% lower than they
were 5 years before separation.
Table 12 also shows that both displaced workers and other separators make earnings
gains between the year before separation and the year after separation. However, as
suggested by ¯gure 3 and table 10, there is a signi¯cant additional penalty to taking a
long time to ¯nd a job after separation. For displaced workers, slow job ¯nders earn an
extra 4.7 percent less than other displaced workers post-separation, while the slow job
¯nding penalty is more than twice as large (10.1 percent) for workers who separate for
other reasons. The result for displaced workers could be interpreted in the context of
a declining reservation wage, in which case workers who take longer to ¯nd jobs would
have, on average, lower reemployment wages. On top of this \penalty" comes an additional
negative signal for workers who separate for other reasons. If these workers take longer
than a year to ¯nd a new job, the separations are more likely to have been ¯rings for
cause than voluntary quits, and thus these workers would receive, on average, lower wage
o®ers as the market infers that they have a lower value of marginal product.
Finally, the earnings path in the post-separation period shows that, on average, the
gains made by workers around the separation date are eliminated and become losses as
time passes, so that displaced workers 5 years after displacement are earning essentially
the same as they were earning in the year immediately preceding displacement. The post-
separation decline is not as dramatic for workers who separate for other reasons. Given
the concave form of seniority returns in France66, such a pattern is surprising, as returns
not directly interpretable as percentage changes in the dependent variable. For this reason, we have used
the exact formula, i.e.
yt+1¡yt
yt = exp(¯) ¡1, in the discussion of these tables.
64See Margolis (1999) for further analyses in this direction.
65Abowd et al. (1999) show that the ¯rm speci¯c component of earnings is negatively related to the
probability of ¯rm survival on the same DADS and SUSE data, but the estimates are relatively imprecise.
66See Margolis (1996) for a detailed analysis of returns to seniority in France.
49are steepest in the ¯rst few years with an employer. This declining pattern may suggest
that our speci¯cation of a ¯xed intercept shift in the post-separation period for all slow
job ¯nders may not be a °exible enough functional form to capture the heterogeneity in
earnings that is correlated with the speed of reentry into the labor market.67
7.2 Germany
Table 13 displays parameter estimates of equation (1) for Germany, where we use the
sample of displaced workers and the year preceding displacement as the reference earning
level. All regressions are Tobit speci¯cations, which take care of the top coding occurring
in our data. The ¯rst column includes all workers who separate from a plant that closes
down within 2 years of the worker's departure. Relative to their average earnings in the
year before a closure, displacement leads to a 1-2 percent wage decrease in the years after
closure; 4 years after closure, their wage disadvantage relative to their position before a
closure becomes insigni¯cant. Workers who are not observed in employment in the year
after displacement face a permanent additional wage loss of about 19 percent. Wages more
than 1 year before displacement do not vary largely from wages in the pre-displacement
year.
67Margolis (1999) estimates a similar speci¯cation with individual ¯xed e®ects on a data set that does
not eliminate individuals with simultaneous job holding, as ¯nds that the size of the post-separation
decline in average daily earnings is reduced, but not eliminated. One alternative strategy, as used by
Jacobson et al. (1993), might be to include all workers in the post separation period, but attribute zero
earnings to workers who have yet to ¯nd jobs.




Coef. Std.E Coef. Std.E.
Sep¡6 -0.0029 0.0222 -0.0403 0.0691
Sep¡5 0.0023 0.0142 -0.0586 0.0390
Sep¡4 0.0275 0.0113 0.0231 0.0282
Sep¡3 0.0156 0.0098 0.0217 0.0227
Sep¡2 0.0062 0.0088 0.0052 0.0196
Perm -0.2159 0.0170 -0.1310 0.0191
Sep1 -0.0161 0.0080 -0.0414 0.0176
Sep2 -0.0222 0.0086 -0.0207 0.0190
Sep3 -0.0246 0.0093 -0.0015 0.0207
Sep4 -0.0121 0.0103 0.0280 0.0225
Sep5 -0.0103 0.0118 0.0415 0.0250
Sep6 -0.0280 0.0156 0.0411 0.0317
age 6.2292 0.3114 5.4975 0.6326
age2/100 -6.9903 0.3771 -6.3207 0.7638
1985 0.0002 0.0086 -0.0097 0.0185
1986 0.0355 0.0090 0.0308 0.0196
1987 0.0733 0.0095 0.0561 0.0209
1988 0.1045 0.0100 0.0654 0.0223
1989 0.1140 0.0106 0.0560 0.0234
1990 0.1165 0.0113 0.0647 0.0251
Apprentice, No High School 0.1892 0.0056 0.1722 0.0108
No Apprentice, High School 0.4315 0.0468 0.3151 0.1262
Apprentice, High School 0.3751 0.0222 0.1775 0.0512
Polytechnic 0.6356 0.0194 0.4961 0.0611
University 0.6990 0.0231 0.7647 0.0813
Education Unknown 0.0893 0.0095 0.0602 0.0183
Constant 2.8313 0.0630 2.9633 0.1275
N. Obs. 19018 4995
Pseudo R2 0.295 0.176
Base Education Group: No Apprentice, No High School Degree.
The variable Perm equals one for observations after separation if
time between the 2 jobs exceeded 1 year. The Sepi variables equal
one in the ith year after separation.
We have run the same regression, using our alternative de¯nitions for displacement.
When considering a worker as displaced if he separates from a ¯rm within 1 year of the
¯rm closing down (which reduces the number of observations to 13539), the permanent
loss for workers who have not rejoined the labor market in the year after displacement is
again 19 percent; the average wage loss in the three years after displacement is 3 percent.
Using the third de¯nition (contraction by at least 40 percent), the respective numbers
51are 20 percent, and 4.3 percent respectively (this corresponds to 35031 observations).
All these numbers are fairly close, and indicate that our results are quite robust to the
de¯nition of a displacement.
The second column in table 13 reports results for displaced workers who experienced
a non-employment spell of at least 6 days after separation. The permanent e®ect of
not having found a job in the year after displacement reduces now to 12 percent (which
is probably due to a change in average wages of the reference group). Displacement is
associated with a wage loss in the ¯rst job in the year after displacement of 4.1 percent,
and of 2.0 percent 2 years after displacement, both relative to wages in the year before
displacement. The di®erence becomes insigni¯cant thereafter.
These results indicate that wage losses of displaced workers relative to their pre-
displacement wages are fairly moderate, and these results are quite robust to di®erent
de¯nitions of displacement and di®erent samples. Furthermore, there is a slight decline
of wages in the three years before separation. As already indicated in table 11, losses are
substantial if the worker does not ¯nd a job in the year after separation.
In Table 13 we compare the wage position of a displaced worker after displacement to
his pre-displacement wage. We now estimate a similar speci¯cation to the one underlying
the results in table 13, where this time we pool displaced workers (or workers separated
for unknown reasons) and continuously employed workers. We add an additional indicator
variable for the year immediately preceding displacement. This gives us the wage pro¯le
of displaced (separated) workers, relative to continuously employed workers, in the years
before and after displacement. Results are displayed in table 14.
52Table 14: Earnings Regressions - Germany
Censored Regression Models
Displaced Separated
Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E.
Sep¡6 -0.118 0.0177 0.020 0.0089
Sep¡5 -0.107 0.0107 0.014 0.0059
Sep¡4 -0.084 0.0082 0.008 0.0047
Sep¡3 -0.095 0.0068 -0.002 0.0040
Sep¡2 -0.105 0.0058 -0.007 0.0034
Sep¡1 -0.112 0.0050 -0.021 0.0029
Perm -0.217 0.0150 -0.289 0.0074
Sep1 -0.121 0.0045 -0.047 0.0027
Sep2 -0.125 0.0049 -0.040 0.0030
Sep3 -0.124 0.0054 -0.041 0.0033
Sep4 -0.110 0.0061 -0.034 0.0037
Sep5 -0.101 0.0074 -0.040 0.0045
Sep6 -0.110 0.0108 -0.050 0.0063
age 0.051 0.0007 0.055 0.0006
age2/100 -0.055 0.0008 -0.060 0.0008
1985 0.015 0.0019 0.016 0.0018
1986 0.053 0.0019 0.055 0.0018
1987 0.080 0.0019 0.083 0.0018
1988 0.116 0.0019 0.122 0.0018
1989 0.111 0.0019 0.117 0.0018
1990 0.100 0.0019 0.104 0.0019
Apprentice, No High School 0.175 0.0012 0.184 0.0012
No Apprentice, High School 0.330 0.0081 0.341 0.0075
Apprentice, High School 0.408 0.0050 0.434 0.0045
Polytechnic 0.549 0.0031 0.571 0.0029
University 0.604 0.0038 0.625 0.0033
Education Unknown 0.080 0.0026 0.082 0.0025
Constant 3.143 0.0150 3.045 0.0140
N. Obs. 267044 323916
Pseudo R2 0.4950 0.4255
Base Education Group: No Apprentice, No High School Degree.
The variable Perm equals one for observations after separation if
time between the 2 jobs exceeded 1 year. The Sepi variables equal
one in the ith year after separation.
As already indicated in ¯gure 4, wages of displaced workers are, on average, 10 per-
centage points lower than wages of continuously employed workers. This di®erence may be
due to ¯rm e®ects, or may be a result of workers of lower quality selecting into ¯rms which
close down. The immediate pre-post wage di®erence is again small - about 0.9 percent.
Compared to continuously employed workers, displaced workers continue to have lower
wages. Again, those who are not in work in the year after displacement su®er substantial
53permanent losses.
Column 2 displays results for workers who separate from their ¯rm for unknown rea-
sons. Here wages begin to decline about 2 years before separation, but do not di®er from
those of continuously employed workers before that. After separation, wages are on av-
erage 4 percentage points lower, as compared to those of continuously employed workers.
Again, workers who have not found a job in the years after displacement su®er substantial
losses.
8 Discussion and Conclusions
In this section, we bring together the results from the two countries and brie°y relate
them to the existing literature from North American studies of worker displacement. It
bears repeating that we focus on prime age men in stable jobs (at least 4 years of jobs
seniority). Furthermore, our de¯nition of displacement, used throughout this paper, is a
separation within 2 years of ¯rm closure in France and within 2 years of a plant closure
in Germany.
8.1 Incidence
Worker displacement seems to be slightly more frequent in France than in Germany.68
Among our sample of high seniority workers, 2.78 percent experienced a displacement
in 1984, whereas 6.71 percent of eligible German men had a displacement as their ¯rst
separation during the 1984-1990 window. This suggests that a lower bound on annual
incidence of worker displacement due to plant closures might be below 1 percent in Ger-
many. Both of these numbers, and the German ¯gures in particular, are lower than what
has been found for the United States; Farber (1993) ¯nds a probability of experiencing a
displacement of 6.9 percent for the 1984-1985 two-year period using the Displaced Worker
Supplements of the Current Population Survey. However, this may be due largely to the
68A word of warning is necessary when comparing our results for incidence. The ¯gures for France refer
to the number of individuals who experience a type of separation per year, while the numbers for Germany
refer to the number of individuals whose ¯rst separation in a 7 year period is of a given type. Thus the
¯gures are not directly comparable, although we attempt to draw some conclusions below nevertheless.
54fact that Farber considers all self-reported displacements,69 whereas (for data reasons) we
restrict our attention to ¯rm and plant closures.
As a share of total separations, worker displacements are more important in France
than in Germany. Part of this di®erence may be due to our di®erent de¯nitions of dis-
placement (¯rm closure in France, plant closure in Germany).
The determinants of displacement are roughly similar across countries. In both France
and Germany, age is not signi¯cantly related to the probability of displacement. The
highest levels of education are negatively related to the probability of being displaced in
both countries. Seniority in 1984 is negatively related to the probability of displacement
in France and Germany. All of these results are generally consistent with what has been
found for the United States (Fallick 1996).
8.2 Duration
In both France and Germany, a large share of displaced workers transit to their subsequent
employers without spending any time in nonemployment. The share of direct transitions
is always higher for displaced workers than for workers that separate for other reasons,
and the share of displaced workers making direct transitions is slightly increasing with
seniority. There is a larger share of direct transitions in the German data than in the
French data, which may be due to the di®erences in the de¯nitions of displacement (¯rm
closure in France versus plant closure in Germany).
The durations of spells out of the work force, when they occur, are shorter in both
countries for displaced workers than for those who separate for other reasons. The long
term nonemployment rates for France seems slightly lower (around 20 percent after 5
years) than that of Germany (around 27 percent), and the gap in the survivor functions
between displaced and other separating workers is larger in Germany. Recall that our
administrative data su®ers from the problem of censoring - some individuals do not return
into the labour force after seperating from their job within the observation window. They
may have changed into other states, like self-employment (in Germany), or retirement,
or they may have left the country. Therefore, one has to be cautious when interpreting
these results as durations in non-employment.
69Given that the Displaced Worker Supplements are survey-based, they may be subject to measurement
error as a result of individuals misreporting ¯rings for cause as layo®s.
55Estimations of duration models con¯rm the faster exit of displaced workers in both
countries. However, displaced workers with high seniority tend to leave nonemployment
slower than those with low seniority in France, whereas the reverse is true in Germany.70
8.3 Earnings Changes
In both countries, we ¯nd a result that is contrary to the majority of North American
results on worker displacement. Displacement does not seem to be associated with large
earnings losses. In the French case, average daily earnings of displaced workers actually
increase, relative to continuously employed workers, between the year preceding and the
year following displacement. In Germany there is still a small drop in average daily
earnings relative to continuously employed workers, but the drop is less than 1 percent
in relative earnings terms. One explanation for our di®erent results may be the way the
earnings variable is constructed: While we use data on daily earnings, which are calculated
using employment periods only, many North American studies use data on quaterly or
yearly earnings, without taking account of the number of days worked. Furthermore,
some studies (Jacobson et al. 1993) substitute zero earnings for workers who are not in
work, while we construct our comparisons conditional on employment.
We do ¯nd an important earnings di®erential associated with taking longer than a year
to ¯nd a new job following displacement for both countries. In France, this corresponds to
a 5 percent earnings disadvantage relative to other displaced workers who are reemployed
within the calendar year following displacement, while it is between 13 and 20 percent in
relative terms in Germany.
8.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the labor markets of France and Germany, although di®erent along certain
dimensions, seem to provide roughly similar outcomes for displaced workers. One reason
for these similarities may be similar institutional regulations, like employment protection
o®ered by labor law. Our analysis is purely descriptive, and we have not attempted
to attribute ¯ndings, and di®erences to the North American literature, to di®erences in
institutional regulations. This is a very promising avenue for future research.
70As a comparison, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) ¯nd that the rate of exit from nonemployment among
displaced workers decreases with seniority in the United States.
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59A Correction for False Firm Deaths in France
Suppose we observe n1 workers associated with ¯rm j1 in the last available year for the
¯rm (prior to 1996), and a share p1k were observed the following year in ¯rm jk, k 6= 1.
Using p1k as an estimator of e p1k, the true share of workers moving from ¯rm j1 to ¯rm
jk, we take a normal approximation to the underlying binomial distribution under which
the standard error of p1k is ¾1k =
q
p1k(1¡p1k)
n1 . Thus, if for any k, k 6= 1, p1k + 2¾1k ¸ 0:5,
we can not reject the hypothesis that at least 50 percent of the ¯rm's work force moved
together to the same successor ¯rm (e p1k ¸ 0:5) at the 95 percent con¯dence level. If this
is the case for any k 6= 1, we only consider separations to ¯rms for which we can reject
e p1k0 ¸ 0:5, i.e. for which p1k0 + 2¾1k0 < 0:5, to be real separations. All of these are
classi¯ed as separations for reasons other than displacement, since there is at least one
possible successor ¯rm to j1. All changes in ¯rm identi¯er for individuals moving to ¯rm
k00 with p1k00 + 2¾1k00 ¸ 0:5 are considered to be false ¯rm deaths, and are not coded as
separations.71 In the event that the test statistic is less than 0.5 for all k, k 6= 1, we
maintain the estimated ¯rm death date. This procedure leads us to reclassify 2.6% of our
estimated ¯rm deaths in France as false ¯rm deaths.
71We nevertheless restart the seniority counter at zero the year following the false ¯rm death. This
is because the individuals moving to a new ¯rm identi¯er in this manner are \new employees" for the
successor ¯rm, despite their experience with the predecessor ¯rm.
60B De¯nitions of Displacement
Table A1: Type of Closures
Total Closure within Closure within Contraction
Separations one year Percent two years Percent by 40 Percent
France
84 8309 2498 30.06 2821 33.95
85 8620 3159 36.65 3487 40.45
86 8730 2993 34.28 3365 38.55
87 10517 3072 29.21 3633 34.54
88 8439 3238 38.37 3557 42.15
89 15459 5622 36.37 6349 41.07
P
60074 20582 34.26 23212 38.64
Germany
84 3181 432 13.58 637 20.02 1101 34.64
85 2777 423 15.23 625 22.50 1097 39.50
86 2464 402 16.31 530 21.50 955 38.75
87 2030 323 15.91 460 22.66 774 38.12
88 1821 294 16.14 420 23.06 729 40.03
89 2117 263 12.42 375 17.71 755 35.66
90 1805 227 12.57 227 12.57 570 31.57 P
16191 2364 14.59 3274 20.21 5981 36.93
Sources: Authors' calculations from DADS and IAB data.
Notes: For France, multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year
level.
C Impact of the Retirement Constraint in France








































































Table A2: Sample Statistics - 1984 - France
Continuously First Separation First Separation
Employed 84-89 Displacement Other Reason
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 37.82 6.93 37.65 7.20 38.26 7.37
Log (Average Daily Earnings (1980 KF)) -1.65 0.45 -1.81 0.50 -1.73 0.57
4 · Seniority < 6 0.17 0.22 0.26
6 · Seniority < 8 0.23 0.25 0.26
8 · Seniority < 10 0.03 0.04 0.03
10 · Seniority 0.58 0.48 0.46
No Educational Certi¯cation 0.20 0.20 0.20
Elementary School 0.26 0.26 0.26
Junior High School 0.06 0.06 0.06
High School 0.04 0.04 0.04
Basic Vocational School 0.29 0.30 0.29
Advanced Vocational School 0.06 0.06 0.06
Undergraduate University 0.04 0.04 0.04
Graduate School & Grande Ecole 0.05 0.05 0.05
N. Obs 54918 16876 27685
Notes: Table constructed with one observation per person per year (as in section 4).
E Treatment of Censoring in Germany
Figures for Germany appear in table A3 below. There are 16195 ¯rst separations between
1984 and 1990. 4242 do not return to the labor force within the observation period, and
2943 do not claim bene¯ts. In the subsample of workers who are displaced (according
to de¯nition 2 above), only 8 percent do not claim bene¯ts after separation, and do not
return into the sample.
Table A3: Separation and Censoring
All No. Percent
Total number of ¯rst separations, 1984 - 1990 16195 100.00
Total number of separations who return into work 11953 73.81
Total number of observations who do not return into work 4242 26.19
Of which:
Claim bene¯t 1299 30.62
Do not claim bene¯t 2943 69.38
63F Descriptive Statistics-Germany
Table A4: Sample Statistics - 1984 - Germany
Continuously First Separation First Separation
Employed 84-90 Displacement Other Reason
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Age 39.42 7.30 39.10 7.30 37.59 7.40
Daily wage¤ 85.01 21.07 77.15 21.07 83.15 21.88
Log of daily wage 4.41 0.30 4.30 0.30 4.38 0.27
4 · Seniority < 6 15.89 18.74 26.52
6 · Seniority < 8 13.79 17.24 17.47
8 · Seniority < 10 25.76 29.13 25.23
10 · Seniority 44.47 26.90 23.81
No Apprentice, No High School 19.55 18.41 17.21
Apprentice, No High School 68.72 71.22 66.85
No Apprentice, High School 0.37 0.26 0.47
Apprentice, High School 1.05 0.96 1.44
Polytechnic 3.53 1.49 4.46
University 2.63 1.03 4.46
Education Unknown 4.10 6.59 5.09
Firm Size, 1982 3086 8376 160 394 1653 5003
Firm Size, 1982 (Median) 369 34 173
Sec1: Primary 0.59 3.72 1.83
Sec2: Energy 2.59 0.39 0.98
Sec3: Mining 1.08 1.39 1.86
Sec4: Manufacturing 54.40 42.45 46.37
Sec5: Construction 7.95 21.41 11.60
Sec6: Distributional Services 13.09 20.61 19.18
Sec7: Industry Services 6.08 4.52 6.79
Sec8: Consumer Services 1.24 1.03 1.38
Sec9: Public Services 12.93 4.42 9.97
N. Obs 32235 3003 10266
¤: In German Marks (de°ated to 1975 prices).
64G Incidence Probit Models Using the Continuously
Employed as the Reference Group - France
Table A5: Probit Models of Incidence of Separation by Type
Relative to Continuously Employed - France, 1984
Displacements Other Separations
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Age -0.0104 0.0145 -0.0090 0.0113
Age2/100 0.0184 0.0188 0.0165 0.0145
4 · Seniority < 6 0.2268 0.0240 0.3764 0.0181
6 · Seniority < 8 0.1453 0.0227 0.1989 0.0177
8 · Seniority < 10 0.1529 0.0489 0.0414 0.0462
Elementary School -0.1076 0.0728 0.0112 0.0578
Junior High School 0.0989 0.1072 0.0273 0.0886
High School 0.1504 0.1303 0.0940 0.1076
Basic Vocational School -0.1130 0.0697 -0.1009 0.0569
Advanced Vocational School -0.2434 0.1244 -0.0669 0.0877
Undergraduate 0.1933 0.1216 0.2030 0.0940
Graduate School & Grande Ecole 0.0065 0.1165 0.3766 0.0802
Constant -2.0991 0.2920 -1.6256 0.2243
N. Obs. 71794 82603
Log Likelihood -11264.46 -19432.70
Source: Authors' calculations from DADS data.
Notes: Estimates include data from 1984 only, aggregated to one
observation per individual. All models also include controls for sector
(15 categories) and skill level (3 categories). Reference groups: No
educational certi¯cation and 10 or more years of seniority. Models
estimate the probability of speci¯ed type of separation relative to
workers who were continuously employed with the same ¯rm throughout
the sample window (1984-1989).
65H Weibull Proportional Hazard Model - Germany
Table A6: Weibull Proportional Hazard Models - Germany
All Other
Separations Separations Displacements
Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E. Coef. Std.E.
Age -3.2793 0.2255 -3.7131 0.2597 -1.9628 0.4639
6 · Seniority < 8 0.0248 0.0570 0.0228 0.0641 0.0664 0.1284
8 · Seniority < 10 0.0633 0.0531 0.0293 0.0602 0.2250 0.1177
10 · Seniority -0.0232 0.0617 -0.1118 0.0704 0.3081 0.1321
Displacement 0.4250 0.0387
Apprentice, No High School 0.4008 0.0407 0.4332 0.0468 0.3000 0.0826
No Apprentice, High School 0.2073 0.3041 0.2422 0.3367 0.0591 0.7156
Apprentice, High School 0.0200 0.1710 0.3562 0.1935 -0.7274 0.3639
Polytechnic 0.2319 0.1309 0.3627 0.1421 -0.2392 0.3426
University 0.0909 0.1276 0.2074 0.1302 -1.9875 1.0042
Education Unknown 0.0522 0.0721 0.0748 0.0842 -0.0251 0.1404
1985 0.1383 0.0485 0.1707 0.0564 0.0949 0.0963
1986 0.2598 0.0547 0.2658 0.0626 0.2745 0.1137
1987 0.2319 0.0619 0.3066 0.0706 0.0180 0.1302
1988 0.2537 0.0694 0.2971 0.0794 0.1344 0.1437
1989 0.2703 0.0781 0.3438 0.0879 0.0447 0.1732
1990 0.0950 0.1026 0.0222 0.1170 0.7691 0.2106
Constant -2.3947 0.1054 -2.1522 0.1184 -2.8565 0.2349
Weibull Shape Parameter 0.51 0.49 0.56
Number of Observations 5019 3998 1021
Number of Failures 3720 2813 907
Log Likelihood -9666.48 -7531.57 -2087.78
Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 1990.
66I Estimations Comparing Di®erent De¯nitions of Dis-
placement for Germany
Table A7: Constrainted Earnings Regressions - Germany
Displaced Workers
Within 1 Year Within 2 Years 40 Shrinkage
Coef. Std.E Coef. Std.E.. Coef. Std.E.
Perm -0.2087 0.0220 -0.2161 0.0169 -0.2318 0.0123
Sep1 -0.0233 0.0075 -0.0228 0.0062 -0.0331 0.0045
Sep2 -0.0333 0.0083 -0.0291 0.0069 -0.0410 0.0050
Sep3 -0.0353 0.0094 -0.0307 0.0078 -0.0435 0.0056
Sep4 -0.0286 0.0106 -0.0189 0.0088 -0.0360 0.0063
Sep5 -0.0339 0.0127 -0.0162 0.0104 -0.0437 0.0075
Sep6 -0.0499 0.0176 -0.0343 0.0144 -0.0576 0.0105
age 6.3572 0.3513 6.1706 0.2909 5.8927 0.2112
age2/100 -7.1835 0.4260 -6.9319 0.3529 -6.4522 0.2561
1985 -0.0065 0.0091 -0.0007 0.0076 0.0042 0.0055
1986 0.0351 0.0093 0.0389 0.0078 0.0437 0.0056
1987 0.0720 0.0096 0.0710 0.0081 0.0769 0.0058
1988 0.1064 0.0100 0.1065 0.0084 0.1114 0.0060
1989 0.1183 0.0105 0.1133 0.0088 0.1204 0.0063
1990 0.1259 0.0114 0.1167 0.0096 0.1204 0.0068
Apprentice, No High School 0.1816 0.0064 0.1883 0.0052 0.2041 0.0038
No Apprentice, High School 0.3962 0.0510 0.4260 0.0442 0.3774 0.0314
Apprentice, High School 0.3247 0.0267 0.3799 0.0211 0.4318 0.0147
Polytechnic 0.6629 0.0222 0.6363 0.0181 0.6263 0.0098
University 0.6635 0.0258 0.6933 0.0216 0.6787 0.0120
Education Unknown 0.0952 0.0109 0.0918 0.0089 0.1097 0.0065
Constant 2.8071 0.0709 2.8521 0.0586 2.9082 0.0427
N. Obs. 15346 21519 39669
Pseudo R2 0.2743 0.2980 0.3618
Base Education Group: No Apprentice, No High School Degree.
The variable Perm equals one for observations after separation if time between the 2 jobs
exceeded 1 year. The Sepi variables equal one in the ith year before/after separation.
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